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PRIVATE LAW IN THE GAPS 
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski* 
 
Private law subjects like tort, contract, and property are traditionally 
taken to be at the core of the common law tradition, yet statutes 
increasingly intersect with these bodies of doctrine.  This Article draws on 
recent work in private law theory and statutory interpretation to consider 
afresh what courts should do with private law in statutory gaps.  In 
particular, it focuses on statutes touching on tort law, a field at the leading 
edge of private law theory. 
This Article’s analysis unsettles some conventional wisdom about the 
intersection of private law and statutes.  Many leading tort scholars and 
jurists embrace a regulatory conception of private law while also 
advocating courts’ independent judgment in statutory gaps.  Much public 
law theory on statutory interpretation, however, challenges this preference 
for background law over legislative policy, at least when private law is 
understood primarily as public regulation.  By contrast, the more a court 
views private law as a coherent practice autonomous from public 
regulation, the more justification it has to develop that doctrine amid 
legislative silence.  This space for creativity can be most pronounced for 
statutory formalists like textualists, a counterintuitive implication given the 
latter approach’s association with judicial restraint. 
Finally, the analysis illuminates the larger question of whether private 
law adjudication and scholarship need an intervention from public law 
theory in statutory interpretation.  If, as much law and scholarship 
presumes, private law is simply public regulation by adjudicative means, 
most every question at the junction of private law and legislation concerns 
statutory interpretation broadly understood.  In that case, private law 
scholars’ indifference about public law scholarship in legislation is difficult 
to defend.  By comparison, private law’s innocence of statutory 
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Cushman, Don Drakeman, Richard Ekins, Chad Flanders, Erin Morrow Hawley, Josh 
Hawley, John Inazu, Randy Kozel, James Lee, Mark McKenna, Nina Mendelson, Henry 
Monaghan, Caleb Nelson, Sir Philip Sales, Ryan Scott, Jan van Zyl Smit, Larry Solan, Larry 
Solum, Kevin Stack, and Grégoire Webber for thoughtful reading and helpful comments, 
criticisms, and questions.  This Article also benefited from law faculty workshops at Indiana 
University-Bloomington, Notre Dame, Villanova University, and Washington University in 
St. Louis.  Especial thanks, as always, to Sarah Pojanowski. 
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interpretation theory is more easily justified on noninstrumental 
assumptions about background doctrine. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between positively enacted legislation and uncodified, 
“unwritten” law is a perennial source of puzzles.  American law usually 
frames this problem as reconciling the legislature’s statutes with the 
judiciary’s repository of common law.  Yet this traditional dichotomy 
oversimplifies matters, given how many species of doctrine exist under the 
genus “common law.”  Most obvious are first-year law school subjects like 
tort, contract, and property.  But commentators also speak of constitutional 
common law, the common law of statutory interpretation, procedural 
common law, administrative common law, the common law of conflicts of 
law, specialized enclaves of federal common law, and even “common-law” 
statutes.1  And so on.  The differences between these bodies of doctrine 
might be more significant than the shared absence of codification.  For this 
reason, disaggregating “common law” or “unwritten law” can improve our 
understanding of the interactions between legislation and judicial doctrine. 
This Article carves off a significant slice of unwritten law for such a 
focused exploration:  the rules and principles of “private law,” in contrast to 
“public law.”  Private law subjects like tort, contract, and property are 
traditionally understood to be at the core of the common law tradition, yet 
statutes increasingly intersect with these bodies of doctrine.  In tort law, 
legislation codifies, modifies, and abrogates traditional causes of action, 
while also creating new ones.2  States’ adoption of parts of the Uniform 
Commercial Code enmeshes contract and commercial law in legislation.3  
Even first-year property staples like adverse possession and the rule against 
perpetuities are often governed by legislation, not judicial precedent alone.4  
 
 1. See, e.g., Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813 (2008); 
Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation:  Erie for the Age of 
Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753 (2013); Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretive 
Methodology and Delegations to Courts:  Are “Common-Law Statutes” Different?, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 89 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013); 
Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 
(1985); Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1293 (2012); Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword:  Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. 
L. REV. 1 (1975); Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between 
Statutes and Unwritten Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (2013) (conflicts of law). 
 2. See, e.g., National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 
(2006) (modifying products liability); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-23-1-1 (LexisNexis 2012) 
(creating wrongful death action); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912a (West 2010) 
(codifying medical malpractice actions). 
 3. See, e.g., CAL. COM. CODE § 1101 (West 2007). 
 4. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.18 (West 2013) (adverse possession); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-12.1 (2013) (rule against perpetuities). 
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One of the most pressing questions such interactions raise is what 
interpreters are to do with gaps—legislative silences—in statutory regimes 
set against the background of this unwritten private law.  This question 
sharply divides courts.5  Answering it involves understandings about the 
nature of private law doctrine, the relationship between courts and 
legislatures, and proper methods of statutory interpretation.  In short, the 
answer here must integrate theories of private law and statutes. 
The resources for this integration are rich but underutilized.  In recent 
years, private law theory has enjoyed a renaissance, with scholars 
challenging the received wisdom that these bodies of law are merely public 
regulation by private attorneys general.  Few in the debate about the 
autonomy of private law, however, give sustained attention to legislation.  
By the same token, much scholarship on statutory interpretation, a field that 
has also witnessed great theoretical development, considers itself to be 
operating in the realm of public law.  Thus, “the revival of theory in 
statutory interpretation”6 (which has yielded the “new public law 
movement”7 and the “new textualism”8) and the freshly minted “new 
private law”9 movement have been revolutions running in parallel.  The 
increasing interaction between private law and statutes demands that these 
two lines of inquiry intersect.  With that goal in mind, this Article draws on 
recent work in both lines of scholarship to consider anew how courts should 
apply statutes that intersect with established bodies of private law.  In 
particular, the analysis will focus on tort law, a field at the leading edge of 
recent arguments about the character of private law.10 
To undertake such analysis, it is important to grasp two separate 
dichotomies in legal theory.  First, there is the opposition between 
instrumental and conceptual theories of private law.  The instrumentalist 
 
 5. See, e.g., Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011) (analyzing whether a 
federal vaccine injury incorporates Restatement principles on products liability); O’Neal v. 
St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 791 N.W.2d 853 (Mich. 2010) (reconciling a tort causation 
statute with previous jurisprudence); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 
1954) (considering whether a state sales act governs a suit based on negligent blood 
transfusion); cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 544 
(1983) (arguing in the context of federal law that “unless the statute plainly hands courts the 
power to create and revise a form of common law, the domain of the statute should be 
restricted to cases anticipated by its framers and expressly resolved in the legislative 
process”). 
 6. Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat:  The Revival of Theory in 
Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241 (1992). 
 7. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement:  
Moderation As a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707 (1991). 
 8. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); 
John F. Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287 (2010) (defining, 
tracing the history of, and defending modern textualism). 
 9. See Symposium, The New Private Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1639 (2012). 
 10. See JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF 
PRIVATE LAW (1995); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of 
MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort 
Law:  Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997). 
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approach questions private law’s distinctiveness, treating the doctrine as a 
form of public regulation that happens to be implemented through litigation.  
In contrast, conceptualist theories understand private law as a body of 
doctrine that is coherent on its own terms and meaningfully autonomous 
from the state’s legislative aims.  The second dichotomy concerns theories 
of statutory interpretation originating in public law jurisprudence.  
Functionalist approaches treat the legislature’s goals as the lodestar of 
statutory interpretation.  Formalist approaches privilege the “letter” of a 
statute over underlying legislative “spirit” when the two conflict. 
This Article pulls together these dichotomies to examine their 
implications at the intersection of private law and legislation.  The extent of 
legislation’s displacement of background private law, I argue, turns most 
significantly on the interpreter’s theory of private law.  If private law fields, 
like tort, are best understood on instrumentalist terms, the case for 
differentiating statutes concerning tort law from other legislation is weaker, 
as are claims to privilege preexisting judicial understandings of that law.  
So conceived, private law in the gaps is vulnerable to displacement, 
irrespective of whether an interpreter adheres to a formalist or a 
functionalist approach to statutes.  By contrast, the more interpreters regard 
private law doctrine as having an autonomous, internally coherent 
character, the more freedom courts have to develop private law on its own 
terms where the legislature is silent or has spoken unclearly.  This space for 
creative elaboration of background private law may be most pronounced for 
courts that embrace formalist approaches to statutory interpretation, such as 
textualism. 
These conclusions challenge received wisdom about the intersection of 
private law and statutes.  For example, many leading tort scholars and 
jurists embrace instrumentalist theories of private law and scorn formalist 
approaches to statutory interpretation.  At the same time, they also assume 
broad judicial independence to make tort law in statutory gaps.  This 
Article’s analysis challenges that approach to private law in the gaps.  If the 
lodestar of statutory interpretation is elaboration of legislative purpose, and 
if private law is defeasible legislation by judicial means, it seems that the 
questions of statutory aims and policies should be of overriding concern 
when courts confront gaps, not the independent judicial policymaking that 
so often plays an outsized role. 
By contrast, judicial creativity in statutory gaps is most readily justified 
by a conjunction of the statutory formalism and private law conceptualism 
that these commentators reject.  An interpreter’s insistence on a principled 
distinction between a statute’s semantic meaning and its unenacted purpose 
leaves more room for courts to maintain and develop private law in the 
absence of an explicit contradiction with legislative rules.  An 
understanding that refuses to equate background private law norms with the 
state’s posited regulation, moreover, helps insulate that doctrine from the 
arguments that modern statutory formalists often use to displace judicial 
creativity in the gaps.  The closer a court’s private law theory approaches 
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the conceptualism derided by legal realists and their progeny, the more 
resistant that court’s private law will be to the preemptive sweep implied by 
the very different kind of formalism that animates interpretive theories like 
textualism.11  In short, a union of formalist methodologies—an approach 
that defies much conventional wisdom in American private law 
scholarship—most easily justifies the interstitial creativity that so many 
private law scholars afford to judges.  Furthermore, the strong link between 
judicial restraint and formalism in statutory interpretation may not be a 
necessary truth but, rather, a product of interpretive theorists’ focus on 
federal public law, their embrace of legal instrumentalism, or both. 
The conclusions above suggest an answer to the larger question of 
whether private law needs an intervention from public law theory on 
statutory interpretation.  The more firmly one embraces a conceptualist 
understanding in which private law is politically autonomous and internally 
coherent, the less the proximity of statutes and private law will implicate 
questions of statutory interpretation.  If, on the other hand, private law is 
merely public regulation by adjudicative means, private law and 
scholarship’s disinterest in statutory interpretation is much harder to defend.  
Instrumentalists face the choice of either reconsidering their underlying 
concept of private law, accepting diminished judicial autonomy in 
legislative gaps, or offering a justification for current practice that 
incorporates the insights of public law theory on legislation.  The first two 
options are unlikely to be palatable, and the third, while possible, requires 
much more work than current commentators have been willing to expend.12 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I discusses functionalist and 
formalist approaches to legislation.  Part II.A introduces the traditional 
distinction between private law and public law.  The remainder of Part II 
categorizes instrumentalist and conceptual theories of private law.  Part III 
explains the problem of gaps at the intersection of uncodified private law 
and legislation and provides cases exemplifying three very different 
approaches to that problem.  Parts IV and V bring theories of private law 
and statutory interpretation together.  Part IV analyzes how statutory 
functionalists and formalists, respectively, would approach statutory gaps if 
they understood background private law in instrumentalist terms.  Part V 
analyzes how those respective approaches to statutory gaps change when 
the interpreter has a conceptualist stance toward unwritten private law.  The 
Conclusion briefly explores potential implications for both legisprudence 
and private law theory more generally. 
 
 11. Compare John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 685 (1999) (defending rule-based formalism in legal interpretation), and 
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988), with Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal 
Formalism:  On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988) (reconstructing 
and defending private law formalism). 
 12. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 
cmt. f reporters’ note, at 165 (2011) (“[T]he theoretical debates that have marked the general 
project of legislative interpretation . . . have not yet broken out in [torts].”). 
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I.  FUNCTIONALISM AND FORMALISM IN STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
In the past three decades, American statutory interpretation has witnessed 
a “revival in theory.”13  Recent scholarship explains that much of this 
theorization has focused on federal law.14  State law, however, is the 
primary region where interpreters will negotiate the borderland between 
legislation and private law doctrine due both to sheer jurisdictional numbers 
and to restricted, post–Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins15 understandings of 
federal common law.  This rich body of interpretive theory nevertheless 
offers an excellent starting point for the inquiry, even if it does not provide 
the last word.  This Part provides a high-level sketch of these theoretical 
debates and, drawing on my prior work, identifies how state courts’ 
common law powers may alter the implications of those outside the federal 
context.  Finally, it raises the possibility that this state law distinction might 
be most salient when legislation intersects with background private law. 
A.  Statutory Functionalism 
The central part of contemporary debate between interpretive theorists 
concerns the relationship between the (a) linguistic or semantic meaning of 
a statute’s enacted text and (b) the statute’s background purpose or policy.  
A hallmark of functionalist statutory interpretation is prioritizing statutory 
purpose or policy over the semantic meaning of the text when the two 
conflict.  Formalist statutory interpretation, by contrast, reverses this 
priority in cases of conflict.16  Functionalist theories are many, but the most 
common approach in American courts—purposivism—unifies a conception 
of law as a purposive enterprise with a commitment to legislative 
supremacy.17  For the purposivist, the best reading of a statute is one that 
effectuates the function or functions the legislature enacted it to serve. 
 
 13. See generally Frickey, supra note 6. 
 14. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The States As Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:  
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010); 
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Statutes in Common Law Courts, 91 TEX. L. REV. 479 (2013). 
 15. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 16. This analysis adopts the dichotomy that textualist John Manning draws. See John F. 
Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70 (2006) 
[hereinafter Manning, What Divides]; see also John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions 
About Statutory Coherence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2009 (2006) [hereinafter Manning, 
Competing Presumptions]; Manning, supra note 8.  This dichotomization is not exclusive to 
textualists. See Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 406–07 
(2012). 
 17. This discussion does not focus on “dynamic” theories of interpretation in which 
contemporary public values play an equal role alongside original meaning and purposes at 
the time of enactment. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION (1994).  The relationship between dynamic interpretation, legislative 
supremacy, and private law is sufficiently complex to warrant its own article. 
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1.  Method 
Functionalist statutory interpretation predominated for much of the 
twentieth century.18  The most prominent version of this method in 
American courts was purposive interpretation in the style of Henry Hart and 
Albert Sacks’s Legal Process.19  The legal process method instructs courts 
first to “decide what purpose ought to be attributed to the statute and any 
subordinate provision of it.”20  Second, the court must “[i]nterpret the 
words of the statute immediately in question so as to carry out that purpose 
the best it can” so long as that interpretation does not give the words 
“meaning they will not bear” or contravene “any established policy or clear 
statement.”21  The purpose of the statute—gleaned from text, legislative 
history, and a presumption of legislative reasonableness—is the polestar of 
interpretation, with the semantic meaning of the text working as a backend 
constraint on implementing that purpose.  Consequently, an interpretation 
that, as a matter of ordinary language, is strained but not linguistically 
impossible can trump a more natural conventional meaning that flouts 
statutory policy. 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. American 
Trucking Ass’ns,22 which Hart and Sacks praised, exemplifies this 
approach.23  There, the statute before the Court gave the Interstate 
Commerce Commission authority to regulate the “maximum hours of 
service of employees, and safety of operation and equipment.”24  The Court 
identified its task as giving “effect to the intent of Congress” and 
“discovery of the purpose of the draftsman of a statute.”25  Although the 
Court recognized statutory language to be the best evidence of legislative 
purpose and intent, when the text created an “unreasonable” result “‘plainly 
at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole,’” that meaning had 
to yield unless the text permitted no other reading.26  For these reasons, the 
Court held that the agency’s jurisdiction over the motor vehicle carrier 
industry was limited to regulating workers involved with operational safety.  
 
 18. See Frickey, supra note 6 (explaining the rise of nonformalist approaches to 
interpretation from the 1930s and its leading role up until the 1980s); Manning, Competing 
Presumptions, supra note 16, at 2009 (describing purposive interpretation as “the post–New 
Deal consensus on statutory interpretation”). 
 19. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:  BASIC PROBLEMS IN 
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey 
eds., 1994). 
 20. Id. at 1374. 
 21. Id. 
 22. 310 U.S. 534 (1940). 
 23. Id.; HART & SACKS, supra note 19, at 1245 (“[T]he Court’s decision appears to be 
entirely sound . . . .”). 
 24. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 310 U.S. at 538. 
 25. Id. at 542. 
 26. Id. at 543–44. 
2014] PRIVATE LAW IN THE GAPS 1697 
 
It held so even though this interpretation, as a textual matter, was one of 
substantial “verbal difficulty.”27 
The purposivist approach prioritizes policy context over semantic 
meaning in all but the most ironclad of interpretative cases—and perhaps 
not even there.  While recent commentary elucidates how legal process 
purposivism uses text as a constraint on purposive interpretation,28 other 
purposivist decisions seem to privilege background policy even when the 
words do not readily bear such weight.29  Hart and Sacks were even 
sympathetic toward Riggs v. Palmer,30 a decision famous for prioritizing an 
equitable understanding of legislative purpose even when the enacted text 
alone excluded such an interpretation.31 
2.  Justification 
The underlying justification for legal process purposivism begins with a 
basic premise about the nature of law.32  Law, Hart and Sacks explain, is “a 
purposive activity, a continuous striving to solve the basic problems of 
social living.”33  For this reason, “every statute and every doctrine of 
unwritten law . . . has some kind of purpose or objective.”34  To understand 
statutes, then, one must understand their purposes and how they fit into the 
larger, rational legal order. 
The interpreter does not move from this purposive understanding about 
the nature of law to an unmoored, normative framing statutory meaning.  
Hart and Sacks identify the further principle of “institutional settlement,” 
which holds that “a decision which is the duly arrived at result of duly 
established procedure for making decisions of that kind ‘ought’ to be 
accepted as binding.”35  In our constitutional order, legislatures enact 
binding statutes that compel judicial adherence absent unconstitutionality.  
The need for settlement and coordination leads the purposivist to accept 
legislative supremacy in framing the policies that law pursues.36 
 
 27. HART & SACKS, supra note 19, at 1244. 
 28. See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 121; Stack, 
supra note 16, at 385–87.  For an example of this more modest purposivism, see Justice 
Stephen Breyer’s opinion for the Court in Zuni Public School District v. U.S. Department of 
Education, 550 U.S. 81 (2007). 
 29. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 472 (1892) (“It 
is the duty of the courts . . . to say that, however broad the language of the statute may be, 
the act, although within the letter, is not within the intention of the legislature, and therefore 
cannot be within the statute.”). 
 30. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). 
 31. See id.; HART & SACKS, supra note 19, at 89–91, 1376 (skeptically questioning 
critiques of Riggs and explaining that textual constraints will rarely prevent an interpreter 
from narrowing the scope of a statute). 
 32. See Stack, supra note 16, at 388–91. 
 33. HART & SACKS, supra note 19, at 148. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 5. 
 36. See Stack, supra note 16, at 391. 
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The task of the interpreter is to advance rationally the legislature’s 
policies.  While the statute’s enacted text is a critical starting point for 
identifying this purpose, it is not the end.  If the text is unclear, the 
interpreter undertakes “reasoned elaboration” of the statute to promote its 
purposes and integrate it into the broader fabric of the law.37  Due to the 
limits of language and human foresight, the legislature may at times also 
speak “clearly but inaccurately in choosing the words to express its aims.”38  
In such cases, a purposive interpreter may engage in “imaginative 
reconstruction,” in which the judge thinks “as best he can into the minds of 
the enacting legislators and imagine[s] how they would have wanted the 
statute applied to the case at bar.”39  In executing its duty of “figuring out 
what outcome will best advance the program or enterprise set on foot by the 
enactment,”40 the court may depart from the most plausible semantic 
meaning of the text if it does not promote the legislation’s clear purpose. 
B.  Statutory Formalism 
At risk of oversimplification, formalism in statutory interpretation in 
American law counsels courts to adhere to the limits of (reasonably) clear 
semantic meaning of enacted legal texts, even when doing so contradicts the 
interpreter’s understanding of legislative history, nontextually entrenched 
statutory purpose or policy, or apparent common sense.  Central to this 
formalism is an emphasis on second-order, categorical reasons to refrain 
from first-order, particularistic reasoning in resolving disputes.41  The most 
common variety of this formalism in American statutory interpretation is a 
textualist approach that privileges the meaning a reasonable reader of legal 
English would infer from the statutory text at the time of its enactment.42 
 
 
 
 37. Id. at 390. 
 38. Manning, Competing Presumptions, supra note 16, at 2010 (characterizing the 
purposivist assumption). 
 39. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the 
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983). 
 40. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of 
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 191 (1986). 
 41. See generally Larry Alexander, Pursuing the Good—Indirectly, 95 ETHICS 315 
(1985); Schauer, supra note 11. 
 42. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L REV. 2387 (2003).  
Other varieties of statutory formalism do not emphasize original understanding, see 
Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 
1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, or instead focus on original intention, see Larry Alexander & 
Saikrishna Prakash, “Is That English You’re Speaking?”  Why Intention Free Interpretation 
Is an Impossibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 967, 974–78 (2004) (arguing that textualism is 
most plausibly understood as rule-restricted intentionalism). 
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1.  Method 
Statutory formalists concede that statutes can contain ambiguities and 
gaps and that interpreters must rely on unenacted sources and legislative 
purpose to resolve unclear cases.43  They also believe statutory terms can 
have core linguistic meanings capable of separation from statutory policy.44  
Thus, when considering an ordinance banning “vehicles in the park,” the 
statutory formalist sees a real distinction between easy cases—such as jeeps 
blasting rock music—and hard cases like roller skates, which may require 
reference to statutory purpose.  If an ambulance falls within the semantic 
core of “vehicle,” (wheels, self-propelled engine, large, moving) it is 
banned, however questionable that result may be as a matter of statutory 
purpose or policy.45  In the words of Professor John Manning, a leading 
textualist, “When contextual evidence of semantic usage points decisively 
in one direction, that evidence takes priority over contextual evidence that 
relates to questions of policy.”46 
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Astrue v. Ratliff47 exemplifies 
statutory formalism.  Ratliff concerned a statute that awards fees to 
“prevailing parties” (and only prevailing parties) in suits against the United 
States.48  In Ratliff, a successful plaintiff’s fees were subject to an offset due 
to a preexisting government debt.49  Her attorney sought to claim the money 
free of the offset, arguing that an attorney also counts as a “prevailing 
party” under the statute.50  The Court unanimously held that the reasonable 
reader of the statute’s text and structure would understand “prevailing 
party” as limiting direct recovery to plaintiffs alone.51  The Court adopted 
this interpretation in the teeth of plausible arguments—grounded in 
legislative findings and history—that:  (i) Congress would have preferred a 
different result had it considered the particular problem; and (ii) that the 
semantic meaning undercut the statute’s remedial purpose.52 
 
 43. Manning, supra note 8, at 1307–08; cf. Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All?  The 
Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION:  
ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 357, 384 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) (explaining that legal 
systems provide noninterpretive norms to “handle cases where the authorities have 
apparently but not really determined what ought to be done” in a statute). 
 44. See Pojanowski, supra note 14, at 518. 
 45. Id. at 514–15 (citing H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 
71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958)); see also Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A 
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958). 
 46. Manning, What Divides, supra note 16, at 92–93. 
 47. 130 S. Ct. 2521 (2010). 
 48. Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (2006). 
 49. Ratliff, 130 S. Ct. at 2524. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 2525–26. 
 52. See id. at 2530–31 (Sotomayor, J. concurring) (finding merit to these arguments but 
yielding because the text “compell[ed] the conclusion”).  For more detailed commentary on 
this case, see Frederick Liu, Astrue v. Ratliff and the Death of Strong Purposivism, 159 U. 
PA. L.  REV. PENNUMBRA 167, 173 (2011) (“Interpretive consensus on the Supreme Court is 
not impossible. . . .  If Ratliff is any indication, strong purposivism is dead . . . .”). 
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2.  Justifications 
As a person calling an ambulance in a park might attest, formalist 
approaches are controversial, even if they now predominate in the U.S. 
Supreme Court and the high courts in a number of states.53  This subpart 
identifies two justifications for statutory formalism. 
a.  Constitutional Formalism 
Textualists like Professor Manning and Judge Frank Easterbrook are 
formalists not because of blithe indifference to absurd results, but because 
of second-order reasons rooted in constitutional structure and legislative 
supremacy.  Their starting premise is that, in our constitutional order, 
statutory interpretation requires faithful agency to the legislature’s policy 
choices.  Accordingly, whatever powers courts have to act when there is no 
legislation, courts lack authority to strike down or modify statutes absent 
supervening constitutional warrant.  They then argue that judicial glosses 
that smooth the rough edges of statutes to promote the spirit of legislation 
or to correct unexpected anomalies are no more warranted, even if the court 
does so under the banner of faithful agency.  This is because legislation is 
often a product of messy and possibly unknowable compromise; legislative 
choices about textual means are significant, for they “reflect the price that 
the legislature was willing to pay” to achieve a given end; and legislative 
choice between rules and standards reflects important decisions about 
means.54  A court’s decision to override clear text in the name of purpose 
risks upsetting such legislative compromises.55  Repair to purpose also 
impedes future compromise, as legislators face the risk of courts abstracting 
away particular bargains in light of general purpose.56 
In the federal context, avoiding such risks respects the Constitution’s 
structural features, such as the requirements of bicameralism and 
presentment, the protection of small states in the Senate, and internal 
legislative procedures that place compromise at the center of the lawmaking 
process and give political minorities the power to block legislation or exact 
compromise.57  The federal Constitution’s explicit and exclusive vesting of 
the legislative power in Congress also weighs against judicial revision of 
clear language emerging from such bargains.58  Constitutional orders that 
 
 53. See Gluck, supra note 14, at 1775–1810; Pojanowski, supra note 14, at 482–87. 
 54. Manning, supra note 8, at 1310–11; see also Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, 
Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 93–94 (2002) (describing legislation as a compromise); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 59, 63–65 (1988). 
 55. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987) (per curiam) (“[I]t 
frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that whatever 
furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the law.”). 
 56. See Manning, supra note 8, at 1314. 
 57. See id.; see also Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 584–88 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (describing how constitutional structure requires the primacy of statutory text). 
 58. See Manning, supra note 8, at 1305, 1314. 
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allow judicial departure from semantic meaning in light of purpose or 
policy are possible.  Constitutional formalism in statutory interpretation 
concludes that the U.S. Constitution creates higher-order reasons precluding 
such adjustments. 
b.  Institutional Competence Formalism 
A second version of statutory formalism relies on the systemic 
consequences of judicial adjustment of textual provisions.  Professor Caleb 
Nelson, for example, grounds textualism in the belief that a rule-like 
approach to determining legislative intent will lead to fewer errors than 
reliance on legislative history or imaginative reconstruction of hypothetical 
intent.59  Professor Adrian Vermeule argues that the judiciary’s institutional 
limits recommend “wooden” interpretation that hews closely to the surface 
meaning of the particular clause in question.60  Because judges cannot 
know whether rules or standards generally lead to better consequences, 
courts should always choose rules to minimize decision costs without losing 
expected accuracy.61  For this reason, he concludes that a minimalist rule of 
plain meaning should trump standard-like inquiries into background 
purpose or inferences from statutory structure and related statutes.62 
Objections to courts’ competence to depart from semantic meaning for 
reasons of statutory policy are well known, especially in public law.  Courts 
lack the political legitimacy, expert staff, and general factfinding capacities 
of legislatures or executives.63  Courts also face particular institutional 
hurdles in policy formation.  They must take concrete cases as they come, 
rather than investigating and initiating general proceedings, thus limiting a 
court’s ability to control an agenda or track the effects of policy over time.  
Adjudication’s intense focus on the case’s particular facts rather than the 
broader picture may also lead to blinkered policymaking.64  For these 
reasons, formalists will accept minor errors of statutory over- and 
underinclusion to avoid the wholesale costs of a system in which 
nonspecialist judges engage in particularistic departures from reasonably 
clear textual meaning. 
 
 59. See Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 416–17 (2005); see 
also Schauer, supra note 42, at 250–56. 
 60. ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY:  AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF 
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 4 (2006). 
 61. See id. at 192–93. 
 62. See id. at 202–05. 
 63. See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Reason and Reasonableness in Review of Agency 
Decisions, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 799, 836–37 (2010) (discussing agencies’ comparative 
competence in fact gathering and policymaking). 
 64. See generally Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 
(2006). 
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C.  Statutory Interpretation Beyond Federal Courts 
In the United States, most of the intersections between private law and 
legislation occurs at the state level, rather than in federal law.  To be sure, 
federal courts often look to general law principles like tort to give meaning 
to statutory terms or fill gaps in legislative regimes.65  Similarly, in 
exceptional but established enclaves, federal courts develop private law 
when crafting federal common law independent of legislation.66  Even so, 
as a practical matter, most of the action occurs against the background of 
common law practice in state jurisdictions. 
This fact is of more than statistical significance.  Federal courts, unlike 
state courts, do not claim the general common law powers of state courts to 
elaborate private law.67  The extent of the limitations on federal court 
authority is a point of complex and longstanding debate.  One view is that 
federal courts “lack constitutional authority to exercise the kind of open-
ended, policymaking discretion” characteristic of the pre-Erie federal 
regime and the present state courts,68 a view that could cast a pall on 
vigorous reliance on background law.  Another is that, notwithstanding the 
Supreme Court’s protestations to the contrary, federal courts face “no 
fundamental constraints on the fashioning of federal rules of decision.”69  A 
more nuanced approach accepts statutory formalism while maintaining that, 
pace Erie, uncodified general law still pervades the federal legal system.70 
Untangling these arguments in federal law is difficult and not this 
Article’s present task.  Of immediate interest is whether the fact that state 
courts undisputedly are “common law courts” points toward interpretive 
approaches different than ones in federal courts of limited jurisdiction.71  
While claims of state law differentiation are sometimes overstated, it is 
plausible to believe that a state court’s general common law “powers” may 
warrant more judicial creativity, at least where a legislative regime has not 
explicitly covered a matter.72  This allocation of authority may strengthen 
 
 65. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 613–14 
(2009) (following Restatement principles to determine the apportionment of liability under 
an environmental cleanup statute). See generally Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General 
Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503 (2006). 
 66. See, e.g., Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 
(1938) (applying federal common law in an interstate dispute). See generally Merrill, supra 
note 1. 
 67. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981); 
Pojanowski, supra note 14. 
 68. Bradford R. Clark, Federal Lawmaking and the Role of Structure in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 699, 700 (2008). 
 69. Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805, 805 (1989). 
 70. See generally Caleb Nelson, A Critical Guide to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 921 (2013); Nelson, supra note 65. 
 71. See Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century:  Common Law 
Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1995). 
 72. See Pojanowski, supra note 14, at 522–27 (discussing such a possibility).  Whether 
common law “powers” are akin to judicial legislation is a contested matter, hence the scare 
quotes in the accompanying text. 
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the functionalist’s hand, for the legal system’s principle of institutional 
settlement contemplates a stronger, if defeasible, role for the court.  Even 
some formalists might agree that the constitutional fact73 of a judicial 
prerogative could rebut the federal formalist’s inference against expanding 
legislative norms beyond their statutory scope.74 
The validity of these tentative inferences will turn on the character of a 
common law court’s powers—if “powers” is the right term at all.  A court’s 
defeasible power to elaborate law would hardly justify the purposive 
extension of statutory norms to encompass criminal activity falling within 
the spirit of legislation but not its letter.75  Others might also doubt the 
wisdom of a court invoking the common law tradition to take a fresh crack 
at a complex regulatory scheme governing utility rates or third-party health 
care reimbursements.76  These concerns bring us back to “private law,” the 
core of the common law tradition imparted on first-year law students.  
Presumably, legislation intersecting with this core would offer the 
“common law court” the strongest case for differentiating its approach from 
that of ordinary federal statutory interpretation.  How to conceptualize this 
core of the common law tradition is a subject of great debate, a contest 
whose outcome has serious implications for the intersection of private law 
and statute. 
II.  INSTRUMENTALISM AND CONCEPTUALISM IN PRIVATE LAW 
As a conventional matter, “private law” denotes subjects like tort, 
contract, and property.  Yet even asking the question “what is private law?” 
is controversial.  Some object on ideological grounds to the opposition 
between “private” and “public” spheres in law and politics (or law as 
politics).  Others, less troubled by labels, nevertheless understand “private 
law” to be indistinguishable in terms of aims and purposes from the 
regulatory schemes characteristic of public law.  A line of recent 
scholarship, however, pushes back against strong versions of these 
arguments and defends the distinctiveness of law that governs interactions 
between private parties. 
To define the scope of this Article’s inquiry, this Part identifies legal 
subjects that traditionally fall under the label “private law” as distinguished 
from “public law.”  This Part then outlines opposing instrumental and 
conceptual approaches to understanding private law.  The primary forum 
 
 73. It is important to note, however, that state constitutions share many of these 
compromise-forcing features that lead some federal scholars to formalism.  They also 
include additional ones, such as stronger separation-of-powers provisions and additional veto 
gates like line-item vetoes, detailed drafting rules, single-subject and balanced-budget 
requirements for legislation, and shortened legislative sessions. See id. at 509–11. 
 74. See id. at 524.  For interpreters who recognize legislative supremacy, however, the 
defeasible character of the judicial prerogative could militate against narrowing the scope of 
a statute to avoid outcomes the court perceives to be inequitable. See id. at 523–24. 
 75. I thank Barry Cushman and Ryan Scott for independently emphasizing this point. 
 76. See id. at 526–27. 
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for this exploration is tort law, a fertile area for theorizing about private 
law.  The aim here is not to break new ground on these debates, but rather 
to provide (admittedly rough) contours of these approaches to help 
understand their implications at the intersection of private law and statutes. 
A.  Private Law’s Domain 
Under the traditional distinction, private law governs the rights, powers, 
duties, and obligations between private parties.77  The private law subject of 
contracts governs obligations arising from certain forms of agreements, 
whereas tort law governs obligations among private individuals imposed by 
law.78  Property law governs the entitlements to and rules for acquiring and 
transferring things by private parties in society.79  Public law, by contrast, 
governs the rights, obligations, and relationships between private 
individuals or entities and the state.80  Paradigmatic examples of public law 
are constitutional law governing when the state can limit free speech or 
deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property.  Others are pollution 
regulations, highway speed limits, utility ratemaking, taxation, or rules 
governing eligibility and provision of social welfare benefits. 
Even on the traditional account, there are borderline cases.  In criminal 
law, the state makes its own claims against a private person, albeit often for 
wrongs committed against other private persons.81  Securities law 
agglomerates rules originating in tort and contract with public regulation, as 
does consumer protection law.  And some parts of public law implicate 
private law conceptions.  For example, jurisprudence governing Fifth 
Amendment takings presumes conceptions of property rights,82 and the 
First Amendment’s protection of free speech can trump tort’s protections 
 
 77. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction:  Pragmatism and Private Law, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1640 (2012); Henry E. Smith, Property As the Law of Things, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1691 (2012) (“Private law deals with the interactions of persons in 
society.”); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 623, 649 (Jules Coleman and Scott J. Shapiro eds., 
2002) (identifying and defending the distinction). 
 78. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1052–53 (N.Y. 1916) 
(Cardozo, J.) (noting that the “tests and standards” of negligence “are the tests and standards 
of our law. . . .  [I]rrespective of contract”); Thomas C. Grey, Accidental Torts, 54 VAND. L. 
REV. 1225, 1228 (2001) (identifying this traditional distinction). 
 79. See Grey, supra note 78, at 1228 (“[P]roperty law defines entitlements and regulates 
their acquisition, use and transfer.”); Smith, supra note 77, at 1691 (observing that property 
serves as “a platform for the rest of private law” by providing “baselines” for private 
interactions). 
 80. See Goldberg, supra note 77, at 1640. 
 81. Compare Weinrib, supra note 11, at 982 n.73 (identifying criminal law as a form of 
corrective justice which, in his understanding, is the conceptual paradigm for private law), 
with Zipursky, supra note 77, at 650–51 (treating criminal law in contradistinction from 
private law). 
 82. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (finding that a 
takings rule turns on an “antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate”). 
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against intentional infliction of emotional distress.83  To keep matters 
simple, however, we can safely stipulate that private law—to the extent it 
exists as a coherent domain—includes tort, contract, and property.84  This 
core tracks the understanding adopted by proponents of the private law 
category85 and its critics.86  Which brings us to the central matter:  what is a 
legal system doing when it does “private law”? 
B.  Private Law Instrumentalism 
One approach theorizes private law primarily in terms of the social goals 
the doctrine effectuates and promotes.  To paint in concededly crude 
strokes, instrumentalist theories of unwritten private law share a few key 
features.  First, they understand private law doctrine primarily as public 
policy promulgated in the course of resolving disputes and structuring 
transactions between private parties.87  Second, they tend to treat the 
unwritten rules and principles of private law as incoherent or indeterminate 
on their face to the extent such doctrine does not adopt this policy-focused 
orientation.  At best, doctrinal language offers an incomplete picture of 
what is really happening; at worst, it is a distracting façade.  Third, to the 
extent uncodified private law doctrine frustrates the proper aims of public 
policy, instrumentalists hold that it should be reformed or reinterpreted to 
march in step.  In sum, private law doctrine is valuable only to the extent it 
leads to good social policy, and it is understandable only in terms of such 
instrumental values.88  It is “public law in disguise.”89 
 
 
 83. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (holding that the First 
Amendment insulates public speech about a public issue from tort claims for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress). 
 84. One could also add restitution, a flourishing field of private law theory in the British 
Commonwealth that has attracted little interest in the United States. See, e.g., Chaim Saiman, 
Restitution in America:  Why the US Refuses To Join the Restitution Party, 28 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 99 (2008). 
 85. See, e.g., JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW:  PROPERTY, TORT, 
CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2006); Peter Benson, Misfeasance As an Organizing Idea 
in Private Law, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 731 (2010) (addressing tort, contract, and property); 
Zipursky, supra note 77, at 645–48 (addressing the three subjects). 
 86. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-coercive 
State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923) (discussing property, tort, and contract); Duncan Kennedy, 
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976) (discussing 
contract); Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 
(1988) (discussing property). 
 87. Zipursky, supra note 77, at 625 (explaining that instrumental theories understand 
private law as a “regulatory enterprise of the state”). 
 88. See id. (“[T]he norms of private law are purely instrumental, in at least two respects, 
one pertaining to value, the other to content.”). 
 89. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1959). 
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1.  Instrumental Theories Private Law:  Tort 
Instrumental approaches feature prominently in tort law and theory.  
There, the instrumentalist stance takes many familiar forms, including the 
theoretical ambitions of law and economics90 and the reformist project 
advocating loss spreading through enterprise liability.91  For simplicity’s 
sake, this subpart focuses on the Restatement-style functionalism that 
promotes the twin aims of deterring “socially unreasonable” conduct and 
compensating those injured by such conduct.92  This “compensation/ 
deterrence” approach, often associated with professor and Restatement 
reporter William Prosser, reflected the scholarly consensus for much of the 
twentieth century and still shapes much contemporary doctrine.93 
For Prosser, tort law is “a form of social engineering that deliberately 
seeks . . . the greatest happiness of the greatest number” by balancing 
competing interests of plaintiffs and defendants.94  The “social engineer” 
that Prosser envisions considers an array of inputs when designing legal 
rules, including the morality of the defendant’s act, the wisdom and 
stabilizing effect of inherited rules, a rule’s administrability, the parties’ 
capacities for bearing losses, and the prevention of future torts.95  Of these 
factors, the two-pronged goal of shifting losses from injured parties and 
deterring unreasonable conduct plays a central role in Restatement-style 
functionalism.  The pursuit of these two goals leads to this approach’s 
master doctrine of tort law:  the negligence action grounded on an objective, 
universal, and nonrelational duty of reasonable care, modulated by liability-
limiting “duty” and “proximate cause” rulings.96  Tort law (re)framed in 
this manner, instrumentalists explain, best serves tort’s social functions of 
compensating injured persons and deterring unreasonable activity. 
2.  Instrumental Tort Law:  Duty in Negligence 
Discussing the compensation/deterrence theorist’s approach to the duty 
element in the tort of negligence is useful for a number of reasons.  First, it 
will concretize what has thus far been an abstract discussion.  Second, duty 
 
 90. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS:  A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (1970); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
OF TORT LAW (1987). 
 91. See, e.g., Marc A. Franklin, Replacing the Negligence Lottery:  Compensation and 
Selective Reimbursement, 53 VA. L. REV. 774 (1967); Fleming James, Jr., Tort Law in 
Midstream:  Its Challenges to the Judicial Process, 8 BUFF. L. REV. 315 (1959). 
 92. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 1 (4th ed. 1971). 
 93. See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA:  AN INTELLECTUAL 
HISTORY 139–79 (2003) (describing the approach and its dominance in the middle of the 
twentieth century); John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 
521–31 (2003) (giving a theoretical account of compensation-deterrence theory). 
 94. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 3, at 15 (quoting Roscoe Pound, A Theory of Social 
Interests, 15 PAPERS & PROCS. OF THE AM. SOC. SOC’Y 16, 28 (1921); JEREMY BENTHAM, A 
FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT, at i (London, T. Payne, P. Emily & E. Brooks 1776)). 
 95. Id. § 4, at 16–23. 
 96. See Goldberg, supra note 93, at 526–27. 
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is a flashpoint in recent debates among tort theorists.97  Finally, the 
examples of private law and statutes at the center of Parts III through V 
concern legislation against a background of tort duty rules. 
Negligence requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s breach of a 
duty of care was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury.98  The duty 
element is a question for the judge, not the jury.99  Traditionally, the 
relationship between the parties affected a court’s duty inquiry in two ways.  
An injured plaintiff could not recover based on a defendant’s breach of duty 
to a third party, even if that breach caused the plaintiff’s injury.100  The 
parties’ relationship also could determine the standard of care.101 
The compensation/deterrence theorist has little patience for this 
traditional approach.  William Prosser found the “artificial character” of a 
relational conception to be “readily apparent” and to be “so vague as to 
have little meaning” or “value at all” in deciding cases.102  This doctrinal 
artifice concealed how rulings are really based on “the sum total of those 
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular 
plaintiff is entitled to protection.”103  These policy considerations, including 
deterrence and loss shifting, “undoubtedly have been given conscious or 
unconscious weight” by courts making duty rulings.104  Duty primarily 
turns on policy consequences, not prelitigation relationships. 
In the hands of the compensation/deterrence theorist, the previous 
diversity of relational duties in negligence collapse into a single, 
undifferentiated, and universal duty to take reasonable care under the 
circumstances.105  Judge William Andrews’s dissent in Palsgraf v. Long 
 
 97. See, e.g., W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 
671 (2008); Dilan A. Esper & Gregory C. Keating, Abusing “Duty,” 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 265 
(2006); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 10; Robert L. Rabin, The Duty Concept in 
Negligence Law:  A Comment, 54 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2001); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Passing 
of Palsgraf?, 54 VAND. L. REV. 803 (2001). 
 98. See, e.g., VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS:  
CASES & MATERIALS 134 (12th ed. 2010). 
 99. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 
cmt. a (2011). 
 100. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928) (stating 
that a plaintiff must “sue[] in her own right for a wrong personal to her, and not as the 
vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to another”). 
 101. This is so even though defendants can owe strangers a general duty of reasonable 
care in the most common negligence cases, namely those in which one’s affirmative conduct 
risks reasonably foreseeable physical injuries to others. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick 
Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
 102. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 53, at 325–26; see also Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. 
of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976) (“[L]egal duties are not discoverable facts of nature, 
but merely conclusory expressions that . . . liability should be imposed for damage done.”). 
 103. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 53, at 325–26. 
 104. Id. § 53, at 326. 
 105. See, e.g., id. § 53, at 324 (“[I]n negligence cases, the duty is always the same, to 
conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk.”); 
WHITE, supra note 93, at 125 (stating that the “modern negligence case” is one where “a 
broad universal duty of care is substituted for particularized obligations owed only by certain 
persons”). 
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Island Railroad Co.106 offers an example of this approach.  The case is so 
famed for its treatment of proximate cause107 that people often overlook 
how the case critically concerns the place of duty in negligence.  As first-
year law students learn, in Palsgraf, a man carrying an innocent-looking 
package ran to catch a moving train.  He leapt upon the train with the aid of 
two railroad guards.  The guards jostled free the package, which contained 
concealed fireworks and exploded.  The concussion knocked over large 
metal scales roughly twenty-five to thirty feet down the platform, injuring 
Helen Palsgraf and resulting in her negligence suit against the railroad.108 
The court held that Palsgraf should lose because she was seeking to use 
the railroad’s breach of duty to the anonymous passenger to recover for her 
injuries.109  This sliced matters too finely for dissenting Judge Andrews.  
Duty “protect[s] society from unnecessary danger, not to protect A, B, or C 
alone,” because to be careless is “a wrong to the public at large.”110  In 
other words, once Palsgraf can establish, as a member of the public, that the 
railroad was careless, she can show a breach of duty to her.111  For 
Andrews, as for Prosser and similar instrumentalists, a general and 
universal duty of reasonable care makes eminent policy sense.112  
“Unreasonable risk being taken, its consequences are not confined to those 
who might probably be hurt.”113  Allowing no-duty rules when plaintiffs 
cannot show some duty to them would leave the parties who were injured 
by carelessness uncompensated and the negligent actors unpenalized. 
Accordingly, in most negligence actions, the duty element effectively 
drops from the prima facie case—but not always.  Compensation/deterrence 
theory also instructs judges to use duty to screen out certain kinds of cases 
in which the universal duty of care is poor social engineering.  Most 
prominently, the California Supreme Court adopted a multifactor inquiry 
for identifying exceptional pockets of “no duty.”114  These factors include 
not only traditional considerations like foreseeability and moral blame, but 
 
 106. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 107. Id. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting) (stating that proximate cause concerns “practical 
politics” and a doctrine “of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice”). 
 108. Id. at 99 (majority opinion). 
 109. Id. at 100. 
 110. Id. at 102 (Andrews, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 111. Id. at 103 (“There needs be duty due the one complaining, but this is not a duty to a 
particular individual because as to him harm might be expected.  Harm to some one [sic] 
being the natural result of the act . . . all those in fact injured may complain.”). 
 112. See PROSSER, supra note 92, § 53, at 324 (“[I]n negligence cases, the duty is always 
the same, to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent 
risk.”). 
 113. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 103 (Andrews, J., dissenting). 
 114. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (stating that the “departure” 
from the universal duty of care “involves balancing a number of considerations”); cf. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM, § 7(b) (2011) 
(“In exceptional cases, when an articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants 
denying or limiting liability in a particular class of cases, a court may decide that the 
defendant has no duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires modification.”). 
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also “policy of preventing future harm,” the social burdens “of imposing a 
duty,” and whether a defendant will be able to spread risk through 
insurance.115 
For an example of such screening, imagine a variation on Palsgraf:  the 
injury to Palsgraf prevents her from performing a contract she had with one 
Malsgraf.  As a result, Malsgraf loses millions of dollars and sues the 
railroad for negligence.  Without any constraint besides carelessness and 
foreseeability, Malsgraf would satisfy the duty element, but later 
instrumental theorists explain why freestanding economic injuries often 
should not be compensable.  Professor Fleming James provides the 
quintessential defense of this position.116  Due to the interconnected nature 
of modern life, allowing negligence liability for foreseeable, freestanding 
economic losses would lead to crushing, disproportionate liability and “be 
an ineffective means of discouraging loss-creating activity or facilitating 
loss spreading.”117  Recovery for negligence resulting in physical injuries to 
persons and property poses no such floodgates problems.118  Accordingly, 
while the default universal duty of care should apply in cases concerning 
physical injuries (Palsgraf), sound policy requires a judicial carve-out for 
claims for economic losses absent injury to the plaintiff’s person or 
property (Malsgraf).119 
This carve-out resembles the black letter rule of no duty regarding 
freestanding economic losses.120  The justification differs from traditional 
rationales that focus on the plaintiff’s lack of an exclusive right against the 
particular defendant121 or hold that negligence duties do not protect 
interests in economic security absent a special relationship.122 The 
instrumental approach finds no intrinsic and decisive significance in the 
relational status of the parties or differences between interests in physical 
 
 115. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564.  For a more recent, defendant-friendly example of duty 
instrumentalism, see Lauer v. City of N.Y., 733 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2000) (concerning 
negligent infliction of emotional distress). 
 116. Fleming James, Jr., Limitations on Liability for Economic Loss Caused by 
Negligence:  A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43 (1972); see Peter Benson, The 
Problem with Pure Economic Loss, 60 S.C. L. REV. 823, 830 (2009) (stating that James 
offers “the most influential and intuitively compelling approach” to the doctrine). 
 117. Benson, supra note 116, at 831 (characterizing James’s argument). 
 118. See James, supra note 116, at 44; see also John A. Siliciano, Negligent Accounting 
and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1929, 1943 (1988) (“[T]he 
laws of physics generally limit the degree of physical harm caused by a tortious act.”). 
 119. Cf. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1023 (5th Cir. 1985) 
(noting that the pure economic loss rule is “a pragmatic limitation imposed by the Court 
upon the tort doctrine of foreseeability”). 
 120. Id. at 1022 (“[T]he prevailing rule denied a plaintiff recovery for economic loss if 
that loss resulted from physical damage to property in which he had no proprietary 
interest.”). 
 121. See Benson, supra note 116, at 827–28. 
 122. See Stephen R. Perry, Protected Interests and Undertakings in the Law of 
Negligence, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 247, 269–71 (1992). 
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and economic security.123  Rather, foreseeable economic injuries lose 
protection on policy grounds.124  This pattern repeats in other traditional 
pockets of no duty in negligence.  The qualifications on premises liability 
remain, if at all,125 because of a “socially desirable policy” protecting the 
peaceful enjoyment of property,126 not because of the relationship between 
owner and the plaintiff.  Similarly, the rule denying an affirmative duty to 
aid stands, if at all, as a product of policy balancing, not because of the 
absence of a relationship that singles out the defendant as particularly 
responsible for the plaintiff’s loss.127 
3.  Beyond Tort Law Duties 
The compensation/deterrence theorist’s treatment of duty bears the 
hallmarks of private law instrumentalism.  Its multifactor balancing frames 
duty as a question of public policy liquidated through litigation.  The 
instrumentalist’s skeptical eye toward judicial discussion of obligations and 
relationships is more likely to see doctrine as incoherent on its face and 
explicable primarily through its policy substructure.  Finally, the push for a 
general, undifferentiated, and nonrelational duty of care shows how, when 
black letter rules disconnect with sound public policy, the instrumentalist 
seeks to reform or reinterpret duty to fall in line. 
Notably, instrumentalists make similar moves in other areas of tort law, 
such as actual and proximate cause.128  Furthermore, while it pays to be 
careful when drawing parallels across subjects, cognate forms of 
instrumentalism also crop up in other private law fields like contract129 and 
 
 123. See J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 64 (Cal. 1979); Rowland v. Christian, 443 
P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968). 
 124. See Siliciano, supra note 118, at 1943–46 (collecting scholarly and judicial 
rationales along these lines). 
 125. Compare Rowland, 443 P.2d at 568 (replacing premises liability categories with a 
general duty of ordinary care), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 333–44 
(delineating common law distinctions for premises liability). 
 126. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 58, at 359. 
 127. See Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 358–62 (Cal. 1976) 
(applying Rowland to hold that a therapist has a duty to warn a third-party whom he has 
reason to believe would be harmed by his patient); PROSSER, supra note 92, § 56, at 341 
(noting that the no-duty rule, while “revolting to any moral sense” persists due to “the 
difficulties of setting any standards of unselfish service to fellow men”). 
 128. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103–04 (N.Y. 1929) (Andrews, 
J., dissenting) (stating that proximate cause concerns “practical politics” and a doctrine “of 
convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice”); Leon Green, The Palsgraf Case, 
30 COLUM. L. REV. 789, 791 (1930) (proximate cause); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on 
Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 61 (1956). 
 129. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 108–36 (2004) (discussing 
consequentialist theories of contract law).  For a classic example of functionalism in contract 
law, see Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 191 (N.Y. Sup. 1969) 
(“[U]nconscionability permits a court to accomplish directly what heretofore was often 
accomplished by construction of language, manipulations of fluid rules of contract law and 
determinations based upon a presumed public policy.”). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, 
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property.130  There is good reason to believe that the instrumentalist’s 
approach to negligence duties is not unique to that corner of private law.131 
Judicially elaborated private law is characteristically state law.  Many 
scholars and judges also understand that the common law powers of federal 
courts differ from those of state courts after Erie.132  Nevertheless, enclaves 
of federal common law remain, and federal courts often read statutes to 
incorporate background common law.133  Because much of this doctrine 
concerns tort, contract, and property law, it is easy to overstate the extent to 
which federal courts have abandoned the private law business.  In fact, 
canonical, post-Erie characterizations of federal common law share the 
instrumentalist’s embrace of functionalism as an alternative to any prelegal 
realist “brooding omnipresence.”134 
For example, in its first time crafting a post-Erie federal common law 
torts rule, the Supreme Court identified its task as determining “the policy 
properly to be applied concerning the wrongdoer.”135  More recently, the 
Court described federal nuisance actions as inextricable from questions of 
public policy.136  A foundational opinion similarly views the body of 
commercial law not as a set of decisive principles, but rather “a convenient 
source of reference for fashioning federal rules” pursuant to the Court’s 
“own standards.”137  Or, “to put it bluntly,” in such cases the Court “may 
make [its] own law from materials found in common-law sources” to 
 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 69–71 (2d ed. 1977); Arthur L. Corbin, Recent Developments 
in the Law of Contracts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 449 (1937). 
 130. See, e.g., Peter Benson, Philosophy of Property Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 77, at 752–53 (characterizing 
instrumental theories of property law in these terms); see also, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 
369 (N.J. 1971) (right to exclude); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 
155–56 (1988) (making an economic argument for adverse possession); A.M. Honoré, 
Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961) 
(disaggregating property as a bundle of rights). 
 131. See generally Goldberg, supra note 77 (drawing methodological parallels across 
fields). 
 132. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 133. See generally Nelson, supra note 65 (discussing federal courts); Pojanowski, supra 
note 63 (discussing federal agencies and courts). 
 134. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (stating that Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), rests on 
the fallacious “assumption that there is ‘a transcendental body of law outside of any 
particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute’” (quoting Black 
& White Taxicab v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting))); see S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (“The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate 
voice of some sovereign.”).  On the connection between Holmes and private law 
instrumentalism, see John C.P. Goldberg and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from 
the Internal Point of View:  Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563 
(2006). 
 135. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 311 (1947). 
 136. See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539 (2011); City of 
Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981). 
 137. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943); see Anthony J. 
Bellia, Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 
916 (2005) (discussing Clearfield Trust in these terms). 
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promote public policies extrinsic to background legal principles.138  The 
Court views the broader choice between fashioning a unique federal rule 
and incorporating a state rule for purposes of federal common law as “a 
matter of judicial policy” and interest balancing.139  Unsurprisingly, federal 
common law skeptics and enthusiasts alike often describe the practice as a 
matter of interstitial policymaking.140 
C.  Conceptual Theories of Private Law 
Instrumental understandings of private law abound in the American legal 
academy.141  In recent years, a number of legal theorists have sought to 
defend afresh private law’s distinctiveness from public law.  The particulars 
vary, but these approaches share the basic premise that a coherent account 
of private law on its own conceptual terms is not only possible, but is a 
superior approach for understanding that body of law.142  Conceptualists 
further argue that the basic structure of private law and its language of 
rights and wrongs demonstrate that instrumental accounts of private law are 
inferior to ones that take seriously private law’s autonomy from public 
law.143 
1.  Conceptual Theories of Private Law:  Tort 
Corrective justice theories of tort law are prominent examples of the 
conceptual approach.  These theories understand tort law as a practice or 
form of justice in which an actor who breaches a duty to respect another’s 
legal right incurs a further duty to repair that other individuals’ loss flowing 
from that breach.144  The corrective justice theorist notes that functionalist 
accounts of tort law fail to explain the doctrine’s basic structure.  One 
feature is tort law’s “bipolarity” or “bilateralism.”  The private plaintiff, not 
the state, controls whether to bring, settle, or withdraw a suit; the defendant 
 
 138. D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 468 (1942) (Jackson, J., 
concurring); see id. at 472 (“The law which we apply to this case consists of principles of 
established credit in jurisprudence, selected by us because they are appropriate to effectuate 
the policy of the governing Act.”). 
 139. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979). 
 140. This ascription includes matters of private law. See, e.g., George D. Brown, Federal 
Common Law and the Role of Federal Courts in Private Law Adjudication—A (New) Erie 
Problem?, 12 PACE L. REV. 229, 233–35 (1992) (federal common law skeptic); Weinberg, 
supra note 69, at 835 (federal common law enthusiast). 
 141. See Goldberg, supra note 77, at 1641. 
 142. See Andrew S. Gold, A Moral Rights Theory of Private Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1873, 1882–85 (2011); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL 
THEORY 457, 465 (2000); see also Gold, supra, at 1883 (stipulating further that “a good 
interpretive account . . . can be expressed in terms of conventional morality”). 
 143. Zipursky, supra note 142, at 466; see also JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF 
PRINCIPLE:  IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 38–41 (2001) 
(positing the “consilience” criterion in which a theory that explains more features of the 
subject is superior to one that explains fewer). 
 144. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 10; WEINRIB, supra note 10; Stephen R. Perry, The 
Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449 (1992). 
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pays the plaintiff a judgment, rather than paying a fine to the state; the 
judgment is particularly suited to the plaintiffs’ injuries rather than the 
general welfare.145  The functionalist account also ignores the central role 
of causation in tort law.146  Social goals of deterrence, compensation, or 
risk-spreading are not obviously optimized through sanctioning or imposing 
costs only on those who cause injuries that lead to lawsuits.147  Far more 
plausibly, the argument continues, tort law is a system of corrective justice 
in which a plaintiff who suffers losses caused by a defendant’s wrong can 
require that defendant to compensate her.  Corrective justice accounts for 
tort law’s bilateral structure and requirements of causation.  Further, it treats 
the doctrinal language of relational rights, duties, and wrongs as central to 
the enterprise and coherent, rather than superstructural rhetoric concealing 
policy goals.148 
Corrective justice theories do not exhaust noninstrumental approaches.  
Other important conceptual theories understand tort law as a system of civil 
recourse or as a means for individuals to exercise moral enforcement 
rights.149  An important shared feature of these approaches, however, is an 
insistence on the relative distinctiveness and political neutrality of private 
law.  Ernest Weinrib, whose legal formalism is the ne plus ultra concerning 
private law’s autonomy, denies that tort law has any public function at all.  
The purpose of tort law is to be tort law, an instantiation of corrective 
justice.150  Corrective justice is the juridical form of justice in which a given 
distribution of goods is restored to the status quo predating a defendant’s 
wronging of a plaintiff.  This contrasts with distributive justice—which is 
the realm of public law—and controversial legislative value choices about 
patterns of distribution and broader social goals.151 
Professor Benjamin Zipursky offers a more modest defense of private 
law’s autonomy.  Private law is private in that the state merely provides a 
forum for and means to enforce an individual’s prepolitical rights to civil 
recourse for wrongs.152  As a normative matter, the state is at most 
committed to the value of providing a civil forum in which parties can 
exercise the powers of private law, not to the value these powers “exercise 
or the outcome of that exercise.”153  Thus, claiming that private law 
 
 145. COLEMAN, supra note 143, 13–24; Zipursky, supra note 142, at 457–58. 
 146. See, e.g., WEINRIB, supra note 10, at 10–12. 
 147. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 143, at 25–40; Ernest J. Weinrib, Understanding 
Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 485, 498–503 (1989). 
 148. Cf. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 134. 
 149. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 142 (articulating a moral rights theory of private law); 
Benjamin Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695 (2003) 
(distinguishing the two theories). 
 150. WEINRIB, supra note 10, at 5, 134–36. 
 151. Id. at 210–14. 
 152. Zipursky, supra note 77, at 633–34. 
 153. Id. at 654; cf. John Oberdiek, Method and Morality in the New Private Law of Torts, 
125 HARV. L. REV. F. 189, 190 (2012) (arguing that most corrective justice theorists see the 
goal of tort law not simply to be tort law, but rather to “effect[] corrective justice”). 
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doctrine and adjudication implicates value choices does not support the 
conclusion that private law “aims towards states of affairs that courts wish 
to achieve.”154  In further contrast to Weinrib’s formalism, Zipursky does 
not deny that private law takes account of the functions private law serves, 
nor does he deny that private law theory can critique and seek to reform 
how the law pursues those goals.155  What differentiates this moderate form 
of conceptualism from the instrumentalism it rejects is the insistence that 
such pragmatism “requires understanding the concepts and principles 
entrenched in the law” and the way they are deployed in the legal system.156  
Any such instrumental reasoning will take place within the constraint of a 
coherent doctrinal web or frame that defines, directs, and structures the 
practice.157 
2.  Conceptual Tort Law:  Duty 
For an appreciation of the tort law conceptualist’s view of duty, it helps 
to contrast Judge Cardozo’s treatment of duty in Palsgraf with Judge 
Andrews’s undifferentiated, nonrelational approach.  For Judge Cardozo, 
who was willing to assume that Palsgraf could establish proximate cause,158 
the problem with the claim was a threshold failure to show that the railroad 
breached its duty of care to Palsgraf when the guards jostled the man 
carrying an apparently harmless package thirty feet from her.  The guards’ 
carelessness may have breached their duty to the anonymous passenger, but 
they had no reason to believe they were endangering Palsgraf.  Thus, her 
complaint failed because she sought to be “the vicarious beneficiary of a 
breach of duty to another” rather than to “sue[] in her own right for a wrong 
personal to her.”159 
Conceptualists argue that Judge Cardozo’s majority opinion embodies 
the traditional, noninstrumental approach to duty that they seek to recapture 
and rehabilitate.160  First, with its emphasis on rights and wrongs, the 
opinion is noninstrumental in orientation.161  Duty concerns a defendant’s 
obligation to take care to avoid causing the kind of harm suffered by a 
 
 154. Zipursky, supra note 77, at 654; see id. (“The state is no more endorsing the exercise 
or the outcome than it is endorsing exercises of the right to self-defence.”); see also Brian 
Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism:  Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, in NATURALIZING 
JURISPRUDENCE:  ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY 15, 19 (2007) (“From the fact that a ‘private’ realm is a creature of government 
regulation it does not follow that government action in that realm is normatively 
indistinguishable from government action in the ‘public’ realm.”). 
 155. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 1757, 1757 (2012); Zipursky, supra note 142, at 469. 
 156. Zipursky, supra note 155, at 1757. 
 157. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse Defended:  A 
Reply to Posner, Calabresi, Rustad, Chamallas, and Robinette, 88 IND. L.J. 569, 576 (2013); 
Oberdiek, supra note 153, at 192. 
 158. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928). 
 159. Id. at 100. 
 160. See WEINRIB, supra note 10, at 158–64; Weinrib, supra note 97, at 805–08. 
 161. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 10, at 1826. 
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person like the plaintiff.162  These duty rules speak to actual obligations that 
we owe each other under the law; they are not surreptitious shorthand for 
commands calibrating some external policy balance of compensation and 
deterrence.163  Second, the duty of care is “analytically relational” in that it 
concerns a duty to persons or classes of persons (rather than the world).164  
It holds that “[n]egligence, like risk, is thus a term of relation.”165  Thus, 
even though the railroad may have been careless when it jostled the man 
trying to board the train, it was not careless as to Palsgraf, because under 
the circumstances it was unreasonable to believe that Palsgraf was put in 
any danger. 
The hypothetical suit of Malsgraf also highlights the “relationship-
sensitive” character of duty.166  Even if, counterfactually, the railroad 
breached a duty to take care for Palsgraf’s physical security, that does not 
entitle Malsgraf to recover his freestanding economic losses based on that 
breach of duty.  He would have to show that the railroad owed him a duty to 
look after his economic interests, which requires a special relationship that 
is simply not present in this case.  This variegation of obligation is linked to 
“widely shared moral convictions” that “vary the duties we owe to others in 
accordance with the types of relationships we have,”167 as well as to 
corresponding moral distinctions about our obligations regarding different 
protected interests.168 
Civil recourse theorists like Professors John Goldberg and Benjamin 
Zipursky and corrective justice theorists like Weinrib largely agree on this 
noninstrumental, relational understanding of duty.169  Their approaches are 
conceptual in a number of respects.  They embrace and find coherent what 
many courts actually say in traditional accounts of negligence duties.170  
The conceptualist does not claim that these principles resolve all cases with 
geometric certainty.  All she claims is that the judgment required in 
applying stable principles to varying facts is not the same as policymaking 
discretion.171 
 
 162. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and 
the Place of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 699 (2001). 
 163. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Malpractice and the Structure of Negligence Law, 
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 656–57 (1998). 
 164. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 162, at 707. 
 165. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928). 
 166. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 162, at 707. 
 167. Zipursky, supra note 163, at 661. 
 168. See Perry, supra note 122, at 247 (regarding economic loss). 
 169. See WEINRIB, supra note 10, at 158–64; Weinrib, supra note 97, at 805–08.  These 
theorists may disagree about what work relationship sensitivity does in the conceptual 
account. See Benson, supra note 116, at 874 & n.193. 
 170. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 134, at 1579 (noting their approach to duty 
“encourages us to take the language of tort law at face value”); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra 
note 162, at 658–59 & n.1 (citing cases for forty-eight jurisdictions treating duty as a distinct 
element). 
 171. See WEINRIB, supra note 10, at 166–67. 
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A relational understanding of duty also fits the bilateral structure of 
private tort litigation.  It also eschews multifactor policy analysis, focusing 
instead on the implications of the parties’ relationship given the factual 
setting and existing precedent.172  This inquiry “may itself involve 
evaluative thinking” about social norms and “will certainly have policy 
implications,” but it does not demand that judges weigh a host of policy 
considerations in hopes of crafting a socially optimal rule.173  Thus, 
Goldberg and Zipursky conclude that “there is no reason to think that the 
relational understanding of the duty question is better designed for 
legislatures than for courts.”174  If anything, separation-of-powers analysis 
supports judicial shaping of relational duties, given courts’ traditional 
elaboration of such matters through case law.175  Or, as Weinrib would put 
it, a relational theory of duty concerns the juridical task of corrective 
justice, whereas instrumental approaches make determinations of 
distributive justice that are properly reserved for politically accountable 
legislators.176 
3.  From Tort Duty to Private Law 
As with instrumentalism, the conceptualist’s approach to negligence 
duties do not appear unique to that corner of private law.  These theorists 
have challenged instrumentalist understandings of proximate cause and 
even products liability in favor of conceptual, relational approaches.177  The 
emergence of conceptual alternatives to instrumental accounts of contract178 
and property179 in the common law world further suggests that tort is not an 
outlier in this respect. 
III.  PRIVATE LAW AND STATUTORY GAPS 
It is now time to bring these two bodies of legal theory together and think 
through the intersection of background private law and legislation.  In 
framing this problem, it is helpful to think about law in spatial terms, with 
legal problems existing as if they were on a grid.  If a statute or uncodified 
 
 172. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 10, at 1840 (“The answer [to a duty inquiry] 
involves extending these categories and articulating a principle embedded in the law.”). 
 173. Cf. Perry, supra note 122, at 249 (“[P]rinciples of moral responsibility constitute the 
main theoretical foundations of tort law . . . .  Policy considerations do have a role to play in 
tort, but it is inevitably a subsidiary one.”). 
 174. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 10, at 1840. 
 175. Id. at 1843. 
 176. WEINRIB, supra note 10, at 210. 
 177. See, e.g., id. at 221 (“[P]roximate cause is . . . a “juridical concept under which the 
court comprehends the nexus between the litigants by tracing the proximity of the wrongful 
act to the injurious effect.”); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Easy Case 
for Products Liability Law:  A Response to Professors Polinsky and Shavell, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 1919, 1923–24 (2010). 
 178. See, e.g., Stephen A. Smith, Towards a Theory of Contract, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN 
JURISPRUDENCE, 4TH SERIES 107 (Jeremy Horder ed., 2000). 
 179. See, e.g., J. E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW (1997). 
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rule of law addresses a question, we can say that the law “covers” that type 
of question.  Accordingly, a statute’s domain, however defined, is the area 
of problems “covered” and governed by the legislation.  Consistent with 
textualism and purposivism, this Article assumes that when a statute and 
uncodified private law doctrine both “cover” a problem but clearly conflict, 
the statutory norm trumps.  Accepting that premise of legislative supremacy 
does not foreclose difficult questions about the intersection of legislation 
and background private law.  Statutory regimes have gaps—spaces where 
the statute’s coverage or import is unclear.  Courts operating in the gaps 
must decide whether to fill the gap with background private law, follow the 
legislature’s lead in crafting law in the gaps, or simply depart the field. 
The theoretical frameworks laid out in Parts I and II will help decide how 
great a preemptive effect courts should give legislation vis-à-vis 
background private law.  Without some understanding of the bounds of 
legislation’s preemptive reach, we cannot define the negative space in 
which background private law may persist.  Without understanding what 
background private law is, what it does, and how, if at all, it differs from the 
forward-looking legislative rules so prominent in our understanding of 
statutes, it is hard to think clearly about negotiating the borderland between 
statutes and background private law. 
A.  A Model Problem 
To ground the analysis, this Part offers an overview of three U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions concerning gaps in a statutory regime that 
provides tort-like actions for wrongful death at sea.  This choice of a federal 
line of cases may appear odd in light of the distinction between state and 
federal courts discussed in Part I, but there is a method to this apparent 
mismatch.  The maritime cases featured in this Part fall into one of the 
exceptional enclaves of federal common lawmaking independent of 
statutory authority.  Federal maritime law, like state law, is “a mixture of 
statutes and judicial standards, ‘an amalgam of traditional common-law 
rules, modifications of those rules, and newly created rules.’”180  
Furthermore, while concern about displacing state law often restricts federal 
common lawmaking, that fear played no role in any of these decisions.181  
In that respect, the zone of federal law on which this Article focuses 
resembles the terrain where state courts negotiate private law and statute.  
 
 180. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 508 n.21 (2008) (quoting E. River S.S. 
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865 (1986)). 
 181. See Nelson, supra note 1, at 728–29 (discussing the limited role of state law in 
maritime jurisprudence); cf. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 
312–13 (1981) (“The enactment of a federal rule in an area of national concern, and the 
decision whether to displace state law in doing so, is generally made not by the federal 
judiciary, purposefully insulated from democratic pressures, but by the people through their 
elected representatives in Congress.” (citing Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State 
and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 497 (1954))). 
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Indeed, one scholar has described federal admiralty law as the “last 
brooding omnipresence” and “the land that Erie forgot.”182 
Substantively, the cases below involve disputes indistinguishable from 
state tort suits in relevant respects.  This resemblance is unsurprising; many 
leading American tort decisions are federal admiralty cases.183  
(Interestingly, American tort law is also indebted to tort cases from the 
British Commonwealth concerning accidents near boats.184)  To be sure, 
state jurisprudence offers many more examples of the intersection of private 
law and legislation.  We could inquire, for example, how a state statute 
criminalizing failure to report child abuse affects the background 
negligence rule limiting affirmative duties to aid strangers.185  
Alternatively, we could consider state decisions on whether a statutory tort 
action’s explicit remedies are exclusive or can be supplemented by 
background tort principles.186 
Nevertheless, the maritime trilogy here is a particularly promising middle 
ground for a parlay between statutory interpretation and private law theory.  
The catalyzing case, Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,187 is legendary 
in the statutory interpretation literature, has been a frequent focus of state 
court decisions, and squarely presents questions of duty in tort law.  
Furthermore, tracking a leading court’s development of one corner of the 
law over a short period of time offers a clear perspective on our problem.  
Handled with care, these three federal cases are useful examples for courts 
with general common law powers.  With an eye on these general lessons, 
and not the particularity of federal maritime law, we turn to the Supreme 
Court’s trilogical treatment of sunken seafarers. 
The context for these three cases is as follows.  After the nineteenth-
century decision in the Harrisburg, the Supreme Court’s admiralty law 
 
 182. See Ernest A. Young, Preemption and Federal Common Law, 83 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1639, 1671 (2008); Ernest A. Young, The Last Brooding Omnipresence:  Erie Railroad 
Co. v. Tompkins and the Unconstitutionality of Preemptive Maritime Law, 43 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 1349 (1999). 
 183. See, e.g., United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975); In re Kinsman 
Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.); United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 
159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J.); The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, 
J.).  For the foundational respondeat superior case concerning a statutory tort action for 
injury caused by a drunken sailor, see Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 
167 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.). 
 184. See Heaven v. Pender, (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 503 (Eng.) (duty); Overseas Tankship (UK) 
Ltd. v. Morts Dock and Eng’g Co. (Wagon Mound I), [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.) (appeal taken 
from Austl.) (proximate cause); see also Jolley v. Sutton London Borough Council, (2000) 1 
W.L.R. 1082 (H.L.) (Eng.) (limiting liability under proximate cause when the plaintiff was 
crushed by a rotting boat abandoned in a housing project courtyard). 
 185. Compare Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 309 (Tex. 1998) (refusing to apply a 
mandatory reporting statute in a negligence per se context), with Beggs v. Washington, 247 
P.3d 421, 425 (Wash. 2011) (en banc) (finding an implied right to sue based on violation of 
such a statute). 
 186. Compare Nelson v. Dolan, 434 N.W.2d 25 (Neb. 1989) (exclusive), with Sanchez v. 
Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1983) (not exclusive). 
 187. 398 U.S. 375 (1970). 
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followed the majority common law rule barring tort suits for wrongful 
death.188  In the meantime, Congress passed two statutes:  (i) the Death on 
the High Seas Act (DOHSA), which created a federal action for relatives of 
any person who wrongfully perishes “one marine league” beyond the border 
of any state; and (ii) the Jones Act, which provided for a negligence-based 
wrongful death action for families of merchant seamen who died on the 
high seas and in territorial waters alike.189  The three cases concern the 
interaction between the Court’s background maritime jurisprudence and 
gaps in these statutes.  Our maritime trilogy gestures toward three different 
approaches to private law in the gaps:  (1) using rules derived from the 
purposes and policies of adjacent legislation; (2) applying background 
private law rules independent of legislation; and (3) treating legislation as 
displacing judicial gap-filling powers. 
B.  Extension of Statutory Purpose:  Moragne 
Moragne is perhaps “the most important judicial decision relying on 
statutes as premises for legal reasoning.”190  The accident in Moragne 
concerned a longshoreman who perished in territorial waters.191  The facts 
of the accident were such that the decedent’s family could invoke neither 
DOHSA nor the Jones Act.  At best, the suit fell within the residuary of the 
Court’s admiralty jurisprudence, where the Harrisburg’s bar on wrongful 
death suits awaited.  Moragne posed the questions of whether the bar 
should persist and what, if any, effect legislation like DOHSA, the Jones 
Act, and state wrongful death acts had on the Court’s interstatutory rule. 
The Court first criticized the Harrisburg’s rule, finding little in its favor 
besides “the blessing of age.”192  It explained that the “primary duty” in 
wrongful death cases was similar to that in nonlethal injury cases.  It 
recognized that wrongful death cases involve a different injury to different 
beneficiaries, but saw no reason why a family’s losses should not also 
support “an actionable tort.”193  It also rejected arguments that the 
distastefulness or practical difficulties of calculating damages should 
preclude recovery.194  Finally, Moragne found inapplicable the common 
law rule that a cause of action expires with its possessor, explaining that a 
wrongful death claimant seeks recovery for her own distinct injuries.195 
Just as the Court appeared ready to overrule the Harrisburg as unsound 
tort law from the beginning, it then invoked the “wholesale abandonment of 
 
 188. Id. at 375–76 (citing The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886)). 
 189. Id. at 393–94. 
 190. Robert F. Williams, Statutes As Sources of Law Beyond Their Terms in Common-
Law Cases, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 554, 561 (1982); see Moragne, 398 U.S. at 393–94. 
 191. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 376. 
 192. Id. at 386. 
 193. Id. at 382. 
 194. Id. at 385. 
 195. Id. 
1720 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82 
 
the rule” in intervening years.196  Most of this rejection, Moragne noted, 
was legislative:  wrongful death statutes in England, individual states, and 
the above-noted federal maritime statutes.197  Based on this legislation, 
Moragne discerned “no present public policy against allowing recovery for 
wrongful death.”198  Further, a policy favoring wrongful death actions “has 
become itself a part of our law,” one that merited “appropriate weight not 
only in matters of statutory construction but also in those of decisional 
law.”199  Moragne also found no “compelling evidence” that Congress 
intended to “preclude the judicial allowance of a remedy for wrongful 
death” in cases like this.200  The Moragne Court thus overruled the 
Harrisburg.201 
Although distaste for the Harrisburg’s rule as a matter of maritime tort 
law surely played a part in the decision, we can also see Moragne as the 
functional equivalent of statutory analogy.  Under that practice, also known 
as the casus omissius doctrine, the court will apply a statute’s rule even 
though the legislation’s terms do not govern the case at hand.202  Like 
analogy from judicial precedent, Moragne invokes the wrongful death 
legislation to provide recovery for marine deaths that are similar in relevant 
respects to those the statutes specifically contemplate.203  Viewed from the 
perspective of statutory interpretation, cases like Moragne fill gaps between 
or beyond statutes by extending the domain of legislation beyond its 
semantic reach.  From the perspective of unwritten private law, a decision 
like Moragne remolds the court’s jurisprudence to resemble an adjacent 
legislative regime.204 
C.  Background Private Law:  Gaudet 
Four years later, in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet,205 the Court gave 
further content to Moragne’s wrongful death action, but in a way that 
departed from statutes covering similar actions.206  Like Moragne, Gaudet 
 
 196. Id. at 388. 
 197. Id. at 389–90. 
 198. Id. at 390. 
 199. Id. at 390–91 (citing James Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD 
LEGAL ESSAYS 213, 226–27 (1934)). 
 200. Morgane, 398 U.S. at 393, 396. 
 201. Id. at 409. 
 202. See Derek Auchie, The Undignified Death of the Casus Omissus Rule, 25 STATUTE 
L. REV. 40, 41 (2004); Hans W. Baade, The Casus Omissus:  A Pre-history of Statutory 
Analogy, 20 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 45, 46 (1994). 
 203. The Court reserved judgment on whether the particulars of the maritime law action 
should mirror those provided in adjacent legislation. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 405–08. 
 204. See id. at 392 (“It has always been the duty of the common-law court to perceive the 
impact of major legislative innovations and to interweave the new legislative policies with 
the inherited body of common-law principles.”); Roger Traynor, Statutes Revolving in 
Common Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U. L. REV. 401, 419 (1967) (observing that when a court 
extends a statute by analogy, a “judicial rule takes on a life of its own in the common law”). 
 205. 414 U.S. 573 (1974). 
 206. Id. 
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concerned a decedent whose death fell under neither the Jones Act nor 
DOHSA.  Gaudet raised the questions of whether the longshoreman’s 
predeath recovery barred any subsequent wrongful death action by his 
widow and whether his widow could also recover loss of society injuries in 
addition to pecuniary losses.207 
Writing for the majority, Justice William Brennan resolved both 
questions in favor of the widow.  The majority read Moragne as creating a 
cause of action that extended “admiralty’s special solicitude for the 
welfare” of those who “venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea 
voyages” to families of decedents.208  Seeing Moragne as requiring the 
Court to honor the “humane and liberal character” of judge-made admiralty 
actions, the majority allowed the widow to sue even though most courts had 
interpreted wrongful death statutes as barring suit when decedents 
recovered damages before death.209  The majority took a similar tack on 
damages for loss of society, again citing admiralty law’s “special 
solicitude” for mariners.210  It did so even though DOHSA, which played a 
central role in Moragne, “has been construed to exclude recovery for the 
loss of society,” due to the statute’s explicit reference to pecuniary damages 
alone.211 
The dissent chided the majority for ignoring the legislation that guided 
Moragne.212  As developed in Gaudet, the wrongful death action first 
recognized in Moragne began to look less like a product of statutory 
analogy and more like a creature of judicial background law in the gaps 
between statutes.  By rejecting the limits of adjacent legislation, Gaudet 
treated statutes as potential but not preclusive sources of law, especially 
when they conflict with the “special solicitude” that unwritten maritime law 
shows for those who bear the risks of seafaring. 
D.  Displacement of Gap-Filling Powers:  Higginbotham 
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham,213 the Court returned to the 
question of whether maritime decedents’ families could recover for loss-of-
society injuries.  Unlike in Gaudet, the Higginbotham claimant was eligible 
to bring an action under DOHSA.  And unlike Moragne and Gaudet, which 
filled statutory gaps with the Court’s rules of decision, Higginbotham 
treated legislation as displacing the Court’s power to apply background 
rules of private law—or any other rules at all—in statutory gaps. 
DOHSA provided for “‘fair and just compensation for . . . pecuniary 
loss’” but said nothing explicitly about loss of society.214  The Court held 
 
 207. Id. at 574, 585–87. 
 208. Id. at 577 (quoting Moragne, 398 U.S. at 387). 
 209. Id. at 583 (quoting Moragne, 398 U.S. at 387). 
 210. Id. at 588. 
 211. Id. at 587. 
 212. Id. at 595–96 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 213. 436 U.S. 618 (1978). 
 214. Id. at 620 (quoting Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1976)). 
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that this pecuniary loss remedy was exclusive, barring DOHSA claimants 
from seeking Gaudet’s maritime-law action for loss of society.215  Writing 
for the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens drew “a basic difference between 
filling a gap left by Congress’ silence and rewriting rules that Congress has 
affirmatively and specifically enacted.”216  In Gaudet, which concerned a 
matter covered by no particular statute, “the Court made a policy 
determination” about loss-of-society relief “which differed from the choice” 
Congress made when it enacted DOHSA.217  Higginbotham recited the 
“opposing policy arguments” regarding recovery for loss of society but 
concluded “we need not pause to evaluate” them because “Congress has 
struck the balance for us” by enacting a statute that covers the dispute and 
does not include such relief.218 
While recognizing that “[t]he Act does not address every issue of 
wrongful-death law,” the Court concluded that where Congress has spoken 
“directly to a question, the courts are not free to ‘supplement’ Congress’ 
answer.”219  The Higginbotham dissenters would not have treated the bare 
provision of pecuniary damages as preclusive.  They contended that, absent 
explicit language foreclosing further remedies, the Court could provide 
such relief.  In so doing, the dissenters appealed to both the legislation’s 
remedial purpose and maritime law’s “special solicitude” for those who 
bear the risks of seafaring.220 
On one reading, Higginbotham distinguishes gaps between statutes—the 
legislative silence between DOHSA and the Jones Act—from gaps within 
statutes, i.e., DOHSA’s silence about particular remedies.  Judicial gap 
filling is allowed in the former, but not the latter.  A broader reading holds 
that when the legislature speaks to some facets of a problem but not others, 
courts generally are barred from filling silences, even if the judicial 
supplementation does not formally contradict legislative rules.  This reading 
treats the distinction between interstatutory and intrastatutory gaps as 
artificial:  in Moragne and Gaudet, Congress provided relief to some 
classes of parties but was silent on others, and in Higginbotham, Congress 
spoke to some remedies, but was silent on others.221  Whichever reading of 
Higginbotham is best, the case treats legislative action in some domain as 
precluding courts from filling legislative silences with further rules within 
some distance of the statute.  Such a stance displaces the swath of 
background private law in the vicinity of legislation, even when that 
unwritten doctrine is logically consistent with explicit statutory rules. 
 
 215. Id. at 625–26. 
 216. Id. at 625. 
 217. Id. at 622. 
 218. Id. at 623. 
 219. Id. at 625. 
 220. Id. at 626–29 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 221. On this reading, Higginbotham’s rule is inconsistent with Moragne and Gaudet.  
That does not make such a reading implausible.  Higginbotham may be engaging in the age-
old practice of distinguishing away erroneous precedents without overruling them. 
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E.  State Law Coda 
State jurisprudence reflects the diversity of approaches in these federal 
common law decisions.  Regarding statutory analogy, courts have applied 
rules from the Uniform Commercial Code to contractual disputes that do 
not concern sales of goods.222  Another prominent example in the literature 
is analogous extension of a state’s probate code to resolve disputes 
concerning nonprobate estates.223  In tort law, the most obvious example of 
this practice is the doctrine of negligence per se, by which courts use 
violations of statutes that say nothing explicit about civil liability to 
establish breach.224  This latter doctrine can divide courts, especially when 
legislation requires more than negligence law’s traditional duties.225 
Courts that resist the use of criminal statutes to alter tort duties can be 
understood as exercising an independent judgment approach similar to that 
of Gaudet.  Where legislation, however analogous, does not govern a 
precise dispute, its wisdom is at most a datapoint informing private law and 
might even be happily ignored.  Along the same lines, a noted New York 
State Court of Appeals decision holds that a sale of goods statute, which 
does not apply to blood transfusions, neither alters the background tort 
regime nor precludes a plaintiff from pursuing a negligence action for an 
injurious transmission.226  Similarly, state courts have exercised 
independent judgment where Higginbotham would not, refusing to treat a 
survival statute’s provision of pecuniary damages, and its corresponding 
silence on punitive damages, as displacing judicial authority to allow 
 
 222. See Bruce W. Frier, Interpreting Codes, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2201, 2211 (1991) (“In a 
steadily growing number of decisions, courts have been willing to extend the UCC by 
analogy, thereby abandoning older doctrine on narrow construction of statutes.”); Williams, 
supra note 190, at 586–88 (discussing the judicial practice of extending the UCC by 
analogy); Traynor, supra note 204, at 423 (advocating the use of the UCC as “a source for 
. . . judicial rules to govern situations not explicitly covered”).  Even before the rise of 
textualism, extension of commercial law statutes by analogy was controversial. See, e.g., 
Reed Dickerson, Was Prosser’s Folly Also Traynor’s or Should the Judge’s Monument Be 
Moved to a Firmer Site?, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469, 469 (1974) (arguing that “legislative 
supremacy” requires courts to “respect not only the text” of the UCC, “but [also] its negative 
implications”). 
 223. See Traynor, supra note 204, at 417–19 (discussing In re Mason’s Estate, 397 P.2d 
1005 (Cal. 1957)). 
 224. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM, § 14 
(2011).  The related doctrine of implied private rights of action allows direct suits for injuries 
flowing from such statutory violations. See Pojanowski, supra note 14, at 530 (discussing 
links between implied rights of action and negligence per se); see also Neil Foster, Statutes 
and Civil Liability in the Commonwealth and the United States:  A Comparative Critique, in 
TORT LAW:  CHALLENGING ORTHODOXY 169, 208–09 (S.G.A. Pitel, J.W. Neyers & E. 
Chamberlain eds., 2013) (comparing the two doctrines). 
 225. Compare Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 309 (Tex. 1998) (refusing to apply a 
mandatory reporting statute in the negligence per se context), with Beggs v. State, 247 P.3d 
421, 425 (Wash. 2011) (finding an implied right to sue based on a violation of a statute 
criminalizing failure to report child abuse). 
 226. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 123 N.E.2d 792, 795–96 (N.Y. 1954). 
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punitive damages.227  To the disdain of some tort scholars, however, other 
state courts have treated similar gaps as displacing any common law power 
to provide additional remedies.228 
IV.  TORT LAW AS PUBLIC LAW 
When facing gaps in legislation written against a background of 
judicially elaborated private law, courts must decide whether legislative 
silence precludes judicial elaboration of law within the gaps and, if it does 
not, whether they should fill the gaps with background private law 
principles, statutory policy, or some accommodation between the two.  This 
Part begins this inquiry using the maritime wrongful death cases and 
instrumentalist assumptions about private law.  The following analysis 
indicates that private law theorized on those terms is vulnerable to 
legislative override.  Statutory functionalism prioritizes the extension of 
statutory purpose into legal gaps, while statutory formalism points toward 
general displacement of the judicial prerogative.  The court’s independent 
judgment on unwritten law, when it is primarily policy judgment, sits 
uncomfortably with either approach to statutory interpretation. 
A.  Wrongful Death and Duty Rules 
Wrongful death actions generally arise from statutes abrogating the 
common law’s traditional preclusion of such suits.  Because legislation does 
not cover all actions or answer all questions about those suits, it pays to 
consider such actions independent of legislation.  Wrongful death actions 
concern not merely questions of remedy, but also matters of tort law duty.  
A court that bars such actions does not hold that the defendant exercised 
reasonable care, that the plaintiff failed to establish causation, or even that 
the surviving plaintiff suffers no injury.  Instead, it holds that the defendant 
had no duty of care with respect to the surviving plaintiff’s injury. 
So understood, the maritime trilogy concerns background tort duty rules 
in statutory gaps.  Recall the instrumentalist’s theory of such duty rules:  
tort law imposes a nonrelational duty of reasonable care, subject only to 
policy-based judicial exceptions.  The instrumentalist will presumptively 
disfavor a rule against wrongful death actions.  The defendant owes the 
same undifferentiated duty to family members as it does to the decedent:  to 
not cause reasonably foreseeable injuries through carelessness.  The only 
 
 227. See, e.g., State ex rel. Smith v. Greene, 494 S.W.2d 55, 59 (Mo. 1973) (holding that 
because a survival statute showed no “overt attempt to change the common law” backdrop, 
punitive damages were recoverable). 
 228. See, e.g., Mattyasovszky v. W. Towns Bus Co., 330 N.E.2d 509 (Ill. 1975) (denying 
punitive damages absent further legislative action); see also Robert E. Keeton, Statutes, 
Gaps, and Values in Tort Law, 44 J. AIR L. & COM. 1, 7 (1978) (describing such an inference 
as not only an “error,” but an “egregious” one); Harvey S. Perlman, Thoughts on the Role of 
Legislation in Tort Cases, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 813, 832 (2000) (“But legislative silence 
as to private claims, without more, is as likely to reflect a lack of attention as an intent to 
foreclose or authorize liability.”). 
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question is whether there are good policy reasons to make an exception to 
this general rule.  An instrumentalist might worry that an unlimited 
wrongful death duty might create floodgates and proof problems, thus over-
deterring and disproportionately penalizing defendants, overcompensating 
plaintiffs, or overwhelming the courts. 
To raise such concerns is not to conclude that the policy balance 
disfavors all wrongful death actions.  The wrongful death actions most 
statutes happen to permit—suits by close family members—resemble the 
qualified duty rules courts apply in other contexts.  Like bystander claims 
for emotional distress229 or economic loss claims in the context of special 
relationships,230 the instrumentalist could view this limited duty rule as 
striking a balance that compensates those most likely to have genuine 
claims while mitigating floodgates problems.  The decision whether to 
exclude recovery for loss of society or mental anguish would be subject to a 
balancing similar inquiry. 
Such instrumental reasoning peppers the maritime trilogy.  Moragne and 
Gaudet found tolerable the administrative challenges of quantifying 
pecuniary and loss-of-society damages, respectively, while the Gaudet 
dissent contended that the Court risked speculative awards, repetitive 
litigation, and double recovery unjustified by any “strong reasons of 
policy.”231  Moragne and Gaudet alike emphasized maritime law’s “special 
solicitude” for seamen who undertake “hazardous and unpredictable sea 
voyages,”232 suggesting a heightened interest in plaintiff compensation, not 
to mention a risk-spreading measure to ensure that enterprises internalize 
their social costs.  Higginbotham, too, identified the “opposing policy 
arguments” for compensating loss of society, though it found no need to 
measure the balance.233 
It is one thing to understand how instrumentalists reason about duty rules 
in disputes not covered by statutes.  It is another to conclude that courts 
should engage in such reasoning when there is legislation covering similar 
disputes or some issues of one dispute.  The following two sections 
examine these latter matters from the perspectives of statutory 
functionalism and formalism. 
B.  Instrumental Private Law and Statutory Functionalism 
The statutory functionalist sees the interpretive task as advancing 
statutory purpose and policy, even if doing so stretches a statute beyond the 
reach of its semantic meaning.234  The functionalist’s inclination to extend 
 
 229. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968) (confronting bystander claims for 
emotional distress). 
 230. See J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 63 (Cal. 1979) (using a multifactor test for 
allowing economic loss claims based on a special relationship). 
 231. Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 611 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 232. Id. at 577 (quoting Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 387 (1970)). 
 233. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 623 (1978). 
 234. See supra Part I.A. 
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legislative policy into the gaps beyond a statute’s semantic borders will 
increase the number of encounters between statutory purpose and 
uncodified private law rules, and hence the number of conflicts between a 
statute’s purposes and background private law.  The functionalist’s 
commitment to legislative supremacy, combined with the instrumentalist’s 
conception of private law as judicially authored public policy, exposes these 
private law norms to the sweep of statutory purpose. 
Consider Moragne, where the Court perceived its restrictive precedent on 
wrongful death actions to conflict with more generous federal legislation.235  
For purposes of that choice, an instrumentalist conception of duty rules 
facilitates the migration of statutory norms to nonstatutory private law.  
“Private law” doctrine and adjacent statutes are both forward-looking, 
positively enacted instruments of public policy.  They are two species of a 
genus, differing more in their modes of origin—adjudication versus 
legislation—than in substance.  Given this jurisprudential fungibility, 
segregating these legal worlds makes little sense.236  Accordingly, Moragne 
states that the “numerous and broadly applicable” wrongful death statutes 
“establish[] a policy” that “has become itself a part of our law, to be given 
appropriate weight” in the Court’s common law decisionmaking.237 
What counts as “appropriate weight” is crucial.  Moragne invokes two 
scholars, Roscoe Pound and James Landis,238 who argue that the weight 
should be significant.  Pound reviled judicial protection of common law 
norms against statutory incursion and hoped courts would apply legislative 
rules and principles by analogy, treating them as a “more direct expression 
of the general will, of superior authority to judge-made rules.”239  Similarly, 
Landis challenged courts to apply analogical reasoning to statutes because 
the “judgment of legislatures in statutory rules often represent[s] a wider 
and more comprehensive grasp” of social problems.240  A court need not 
disdain judicially crafted private law to reach a similar result; it need only, 
in the words of Judge Guido Calabresi, not “ignore the gravitational pull of 
newly enacted statutes in deciding whether an old precedent has continued 
life.”241  All that is required, to speak in legal process terms, is recognition 
 
 235. Moragne concerned a cause of action based on unseaworthiness, a maritime tort 
different from the negligence tort usually at the center of duty debates. See Moragne, 398 
U.S. at 376.  The Court has held there is “no rational basis, however, for distinguishing 
negligence from seaworthiness” in determining the scope of duty. Norfolk Shipbuilding & 
Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811, 815 (2001). 
 236. Cf. Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and Common Law, 
1994 SUP. CT. REV. 429 (bemoaning such segregation). 
 237. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 390–91, 393. 
 238. Id. at 391–92. 
 239. Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 385 (1921); 
see WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT 126 (1999) (describing Pound’s preference for 
legislative purpose over background common law). 
 240. Landis, supra note 199, at 221. 
 241. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 86 (1982). 
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that our “principle of institutional settlement” gives democratically 
accountable legislatures the primary task of formulating policy.242 
An instrumentalism that appreciates the legislature’s legitimacy and 
competence prefers statutory analogy in the gaps to the independent 
judgment of the judicial policymaking championed by instrumentalists like 
Prosser or California Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor.243  If duty rules 
are, as Prosser said, “the sum total of those considerations of policy which 
lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection,”244 
and if an adjacent statute prescribes a duty rule for similarly situated 
plaintiffs, any preference for judicial doctrine rests on outdated homage to 
the heroic, common law jurist or highly controversial assumptions about the 
comparative competence and legitimacy of adjudicative lawmaking.  The 
judicial creativity that founding tort law instrumentalists celebrate, then, is 
at best a fallback strategy in the absence of the legislative guidance, not the 
pinnacle of private law development.  The confluence of private law 
instrumentalism and statutory functionalism leads to a strong version of the 
statutory analogy suggested in Moragne.  Fittingly, Moragne is one of the 
most prominent citations to the Legal Process materials in the United States 
Reports.245 
Gaudet’s explicit rejection of statutory norms in favor of judicial policy 
balancing is therefore more problematic.  For Gaudet, the “humane and 
liberal character” of maritime law and the compensatory judicial “policy 
underlying” the Moragne remedy were sufficient to justify departure from 
the restrictive norms of other wrongful death statutes.246  In so doing, the 
Court considered the administrative challenges of quantifying damages and 
the risk of excessive verdicts and double liability, but found them no 
obstacle to effectuating the “humanitarian policy of the maritime law to 
show ‘special solicitude’” to those who bear the risks of seafaring.247  Such 
policy balancing resembles the nonrelational, multifactor duty inquiries in 
some leading state level instrumental tort duty decisions of the same era.248  
 
 242. HART & SACKS, supra note 19, at 4 (defining the principle of institutional 
settlement); see id. at cxxxviii (asking “[w]hen is a question one of law for the court and 
when one of policy for the legislature?”); see also Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the 
United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13 (1936) (arguing that courts should “treat a statute . . . 
as both a declaration and source of law, and as a premise for legal reasoning” enacted as 
“policy by the supreme lawmaking body”). 
 243. See Hans A. Linde, Courts and Torts:  “Public Policy” Without Public Politics, 28 
VAL. U. L. REV. 821, 824 (1994) (“[M]y modest heresy is that an opinion should not invoke 
public policy unless it can cite a source for it.”); id. at 848–49 (stating that Moragne is an 
example of this “search for extrinsic public policy”). 
 244. PROSSER, supra note 92, § 53, at 325–26. 
 245. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 404 (1970).  Moragne is the 
only Warren Court majority opinion to cite the Legal Process materials. See HART & SACKS, 
supra note 19, at civ n.234, cxv n.290. 
 246. Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 583 (1974). 
 247. Id. at 588, 588–95. 
 248. See J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 62–63 (Cal. 1979) (employing a 
multifactor test for allowing economic loss claims based on a special relationship); Dillon v. 
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With federal legislation (as interpreted, at least) disfavoring recovery, 
however, the Court’s policy choice to the contrary resembles the judicial 
intransigence to legislative norms that Pound and Landis condemned.249  
Even if one were to conclude that the best purposive reading of relevant 
statutes supported a remedy, Gaudet would at best reach the right result for 
the wrong reasons.  The concordance of judicial policy-balancing and 
statutory norms would be a happy but superfluous coincidence, given the 
sufficiency and supremacy of legislative policy. 
A similar story follows for a case like Higginbotham.  There, the 
question was whether and how to fill an alleged silence about the 
availability of loss-of-society injuries.  The dissenters’ case for such relief 
invoked both the “ameliorative” character of the statute and the 
“humanitarian” tradition of risk spreading inhering in background maritime 
law.250  From the functionalist perspective, the dissenters were on better 
ground when they emphasized legislative purpose, rather than the judicially 
authored background law, which may or may not comport with adjacent 
statutory norms.  A purposive reading of the statutory policy might prove 
the Higginbotham dissenters correct.  Alternatively, if, as the Court has held 
in other settings, an interpreter sees the “leading purpose” of legislation as 
creating an “integrated scheme” to “replace[] a patchwork system” of 
remedies, she will treat Congress’s chosen relief as exclusive.251 Either 
way, the most a court’s instrumental reasoning about duty can do in this gap 
is to serve as a second-line source when legislative purpose offers little 
direction. 
The combined premises of private law instrumentalism and public law 
functionalism indicate that statutory norms, not judge-made background 
law, should fill the gaps between statutes.  One might object that this 
overstates the case.  Statutory functionalism, after all, does not pursue 
legislative policy above everything else.  Hart and Sacks also sought “to 
harmonize” statutes “with more general principles and policies of law.”252  
In the absence of an “unmistakably expressed” indication to the contrary, 
faithful interpretation could involve a “presumption against attributing to 
[the legislature] a purpose to depart from a general principle or policy of 
[the] law.”253  Hart and Sacks thus endorsed a presumption against “sub 
silentio” repeal of background law, so long as the interpreter has proper 
“respect for the legislature and an adequate sense of the statute as a 
 
Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 912–13 (Cal. 1968) (confronting bystander claims for emotional 
distress); Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 566–67 (Cal. 1968) (abolishing premises 
liability categories). 
 249. See also Pope v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 379, 390 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (attacking the attitude that statutes present “wilful and arbitrary interference with 
the harmony of the common law and with its rational unfolding by judges”). 
 250. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 627–28 (1978) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
 251. United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 444, 445 (1988). 
 252. HART & SACKS, supra note 19, at 1209. 
 253. Id. at 1132. 
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purposive act.”254  When the statute allows doubts about the particular 
purpose, background private law might survive in the gaps.255 
An instrumental understanding of the private law backdrop imperils such 
survival.  Requiring a legislature to speak clearly imposes “conditions on 
the effectual exercise of legislative power.”256  To justify such a 
requirement, it must protect “objectives of the legal system which transcend 
the wishes of any particular session of the legislature.”257  Unsurprisingly, 
Hart and Sacks saw clear statement rules as least controversial for 
protecting constitutional norms.258  The same may follow for background 
private law if it is similarly enduring and foundational, such that a clear 
statement rule preserves coherence and uniformity in the law.259  But one 
hallmark of the instrumentalist critique of private law traditionalism is that 
the apparently central doctrinal concepts tend toward incoherence and 
indeterminacy.  If so, we gain little in the way of principled coherence by 
preserving a patchwork of half-baked concepts. 
A second tenet of instrumentalism holds that private law is legislative 
policy by judicial means.  Molded by steady hands, this law might approach 
coherence.  Even so, it seems doubtful that such doctrine merits any more 
protection than that afforded by the canon against implied repeal of 
legislation.260  It seems likely to receive even less protection than that 
relatively weak canon.  A margin of appreciation for existing statutes is one 
thing; insulating the work of defeasible judicial legislation that lacks the 
legislature’s political accountability and institutional competence is quite 
another.  Clear-statement protection of common law doctrine thus has often 
been the object of great scorn.261  A strong presumption in favor of 
background law, critics maintain, is an unjustified “relic” of judicial 
hostility toward legislation.262  Or, as one state court has said, the 
presumption “denigrates and confines the role of legislative examination, 
discussion, and enactment of public policies,” and it is “long overdue to be 
 
 254. Id. at 1210. 
 255. Cf. id. at 148 (“Doubts about the purposes of particular statutes or decisional 
doctrines . . . must be resolved, if possible, so as to harmonize them with more general 
principles and policies.”). 
 256. Id. at 1376. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 1376–77 (stating that a clear statement “requirement should be thought of as 
constitutionally imposed” and identifying the rule of lenity as a clear statement policy 
“call[ing] for particular mention”). 
 259. Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:  THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 318 (2012) (characterizing the presumption against legislative change to 
common law as a “stabilizing canon”). 
 260. See id. (linking the two canons); cf. United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453–55 
(1988) (finding that the preclusion of other statutory remedies by a comprehensive 
legislative scheme does not violate the canon against implied repeal of statutes). 
 261. See, e.g., Jefferson B. Fordham & J. Russell Leach, Interpretation of Statutes in 
Derogation of the Common Law, 3 VAND. L. REV. 438 (1950). 
 262. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 259, at 318; Fordham & Leach, supra note 261, at 
440–41. 
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put to rest.”263  The cynical acid that instrumentalists find so potent for 
challenging private law’s distinctiveness also dissolves presumptions that 
insulate the doctrine from competing legislative purposes.264 
Overall, a confluence of private law instrumentalism and statutory 
functionalism extends the reach of statutory policy to cover, or “preempt,” 
background private law in the gaps.265  The preemption analogy is apt, for 
this dynamic is similar to the Supreme Court’s doctrine for preempting state 
law rules that frustrate federal policies.  There, federal law overrides state 
law when the latter “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”266  To gauge 
whether the state law is an obstacle, the Court looks to the “federal statute 
as a whole and identif[ies] its purpose and intended effects.”267  Such a 
purposive approach extends the semantic scope of federal statutes to 
override competing state law norms.268  In the same fashion, when 
background private law is in tension with the policy of adjacent legislation, 
the statutory functionalist will treat the background private law norms as 
“preempted”—ensuring that the statutory rules of decision govern, rather 
than, for example, conflicting tort rules on wrongful death or loss of 
society. 
Private law is even more vulnerable to this kind of preemption than its 
analogue in federalism jurisprudence.  In the state/federal context, the thrust 
of federal legislative purpose is parried with a presumption against 
preemption rooted in the respect for sovereign states in our federal 
 
 263. Beaver v. Pelett, 705 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Or. 1985); see also Ass’n of Unit Owners of 
Bridgeview Condos. v. Dunning, 69 P.3d 788, 796 n.3 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (“We wish that 
parties would stop invoking that canon of [strict] construction.  It is an anachronism 
reflecting a nineteenth century preference for case law over legislation.”). 
 264. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461–62 
(1897) (“You see how the vague circumference of the notion of duty shrinks and at the same 
time grows more precise when we wash it with cynical acid and expel everything except the 
object of our study, the operations of the law.”). 
 265. This argument is qualified by the caveat that statutory purposivists have become 
increasingly attentive to the particular ways in which statutes realize their purposes. 
Accordingly, some purposivists, like Judge Richard Posner, may be more hesitant to extend 
statutes by analogy based on an understanding of legislation at a high level of abstraction.  In 
this respect, the more modest purposivist would be closer to the statutory formalist’s 
approach discussed herein. See Posner, supra note 40, at 203 (criticizing the Moragne Court 
for overreaching and impeding future compromises by Congress); Manning, supra note 28, 
at 115 (characterizing a “new” purposivism that focuses more closely on enacted text than its 
predecessors). 
 266. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000) (quoting Hines 
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 
363, 367 (1943) (finding a federal common law rule that overrode state law to be necessary 
to protect federal interests). 
 267. Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373. 
 268. Cf. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 587 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing 
this practice as “expand[ing] federal statutes beyond their terms”). 
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system.269  The instrumentalist’s assault on the distinctiveness and internal 
coherence of private law, combined with the public lawyer’s doubts about 
the comparative competence and legitimacy of judicial policymaking, 
combine to cast doubt on similar protection of private law.270  Accordingly, 
while the conflicting values of federal purpose and state sovereignty leave 
the Court’s preemption doctrine unstable in the federal/state context, a 
functionalist court could more consistently sweep away private law 
standing in the way of statutory policy.271 
C.  Instrumental Private Law and Statutory Formalism 
The conjunction of private law instrumentalism and statutory formalism 
also points toward the eclipse of background private law, though the 
formalist will be more resistant to judicial gap filling of any kind. 
1.  Against Extension of Statutory Policy 
The statutory formalist, deploying arguments refined in recent statutory 
interpretation theory, objects to Moragne’s use of analogous legislation to 
fill gaps between statutes.272  The decision to provide a wrongful death 
action to sailors in territorial waters, to all on the high seas, but not to 
nonseamen in territorial waters may reflect the price Congress was willing 
to pay to protect those who bear the risks of seafaring.  As even the noted 
nonformalist Judge Richard Posner once observed, Moragne’s smoothing of 
a crooked statutory rule into a more generous standard may undermine the 
perhaps unknowable compromise in the legislative scheme and hobble 
Congress’s ability to strike bargains in the future.273  To the formalist, 
faithful agency to legislative policy respects those limits, justifying an 
inference that congressional silence withholds permission for judicial 
extension of the borders of a statute’s domain.274  Courts should mind the 
gap, not fill it via statutory analogy. 
 
 269. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 387 (2002) (regarding this 
presumption); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 290 (2000) (arguing that this 
presumption can counterbalance obstacle preemption). 
 270. Compare CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2637 (2011) (noting that 
proximate cause is a doctrine of “convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice” 
(quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 103 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., 
dissenting))), with id. at 2638–39 (invoking federal statute’s remedial purpose to abrogate 
traditional proximate-cause requirement). 
 271. Cf. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) (“Legislative 
displacement of federal common law does not require the ‘same sort of evidence of clear and 
manifest congressional purpose’ demanded for the preemption of state law.” (quoting City of 
Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981))). 
 272. See supra Part I.B. 
 273. Posner, supra note 40, at 203. 
 274. See supra Part I.B. 
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2.  Against Independent Judgment 
A court like that in Gaudet might instead draw on its trove of private law 
to fill in the gaps.  If we conceive of that doctrine on instrumentalist 
terms—as positive, forward-looking legislative and regulatory policy—this 
move only accentuates the statutory formalist’s worries.  The objection to 
statutory analogy is that it carries the worthy goal of faithful agency too far:  
Congress’s preference for a duty in situations A and B does not warrant 
recognition of a duty in analogous situation C not covered by legislation.  
Decisions like Gaudet depart even further.  They extend a duty to situation 
C and retain judicial freedom to choose a policy different than the one 
Congress prescribed in A and B.  If cloning statutory policy to fill a gap is 
illegitimate judicial legislation, a court’s imposition of novel, even 
contradictory rules of judicial policy in the same gap is all the less 
warranted.  That this textualist critique of judicial creativity originates in 
public law theory is of no moment:  the instrumentalist’s regulatory 
conception of background private law invites rather than repels this 
intervention by public law theory.  Nor is it unique to the federal context; 
state statutes concerning tort law are frequently partial and episodic 
products of compromise.275 
Higginbotham embodies the statutory formalist’s rejection of such 
independent judgment.  For suits that fell within DOHSA’s domain, 
Congress’s explicit treatment of a particular topic was the first and last 
word.  Thus, the statute’s explicit provision of pecuniary damages 
precluded the courts from granting Higginbotham recovery for loss of her 
husband’s society.  As in Gaudet, there were policy arguments for and 
against allowing such recovery, but “Congress has struck the balance for 
us.”276  Because DOHSA does not explicitly state that pecuniary loss is the 
only injury for which DOHSA will provide compensation, one could join 
the Higginbotham dissenters to argue that the statute is merely silent on 
recovery for other losses.277  Against this objection, a formalist must justify 
the “unstated premise that when a statute addresses some area of law 
anything within that area that it does not authorize is forbidden”—a premise 
that instrumentalist tort scholar Robert Keeton deemed an “egregious” 
error.278 
Translated into the formalist’s terms, Keeton’s objection reframes the 
compromise implicit in legislation.  The statutory formalist’s baseline 
rejection of judicial lawmaking in statutory gaps may make sense for 
federal courts without general common law powers.  This default rule is 
 
 275. See Linde, supra note 243, at 835–37. 
 276. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 623 (1978). 
 277. See id. at 628 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Congress made no such determination 
when it passed DOHSA.”). 
 278. Keeton, supra note 228, at 7; see also Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the 
Common Law:  Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 905–
07 (1982) (criticizing Higginbotham’s assumption). 
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less obvious in state courts or in special enclaves of federal common law, 
where courts less controversially claim lawmaking power.279  When such 
powers are background features of the legal system, it can be reasonable to 
read silence as permitting judicial gap filling that does not negate other 
explicit statutory rules.280  A statute’s bare provision of pecuniary damages, 
without more, is formally consistent with judicial recognition of other legal 
injuries, such as loss of society.  If a legislature wants to forbid all that the 
statutory regime does not authorize, it can say so.  Otherwise, there should 
be little surprise when courts use powers that were part of the legal 
backdrop at enactment. 
Although this objection is appropriately sensitive to how differences in 
constitutional contexts shape and legitimize courts’ powers, the statutory 
formalist will still have her doubts.  If presumptive permission for judicial 
lawmaking in the gaps is a proxy for legislative preferences, it is a 
questionable one.  It assumes the legislature would generally prefer to 
transfer independent decisionmaking power to a branch over which it has 
no control, rather than reserving that power for itself or an administrative 
agency over which it has oversight and budgetary influence.281  
Furthermore, if private law lacks the coherence and stability of the 
conceptualist’s vision, a default rule of delegation makes it harder to fix the 
lines of legislative compromise.  Gaps do not frustrate compromise when 
there is some certainty about how courts will fill in the blanks.  The terms 
of deals are less stable when the legal landscape is in a state of flux and 
subject to modification by a heterogeneous group of adjudicators—a 
concern that instrumentalists amplify by advocating policy-based reform of 
doctrine.282  For these reasons, a legislature could prefer a default rule that 
courts fill no silences in legislative regimes.283 
If the presumption in favor of private law gap filling is based on the 
systemic desirability of private lawmaking in the gaps irrespective of likely 
legislative preferences, it faces more fundamental challenges.  As discussed 
in Part IV.B, that presumption recalls an era of judicial intransigence in the 
face of legislation.  The only difference now is that the instrumentalist 
disclaims any pretense of neutral, juridical reason.  The practical politics of 
adjudication—whether in the form of restrictive no-duty rules or resistance 
to statutory limitations on liability—squares off against legislative policy 
without apology. 
 
 279. See Pojanowski, supra note 14, at 495–97. 
 280. See id. at 524. 
 281. See Lemos, supra note 1, at 98–99 (explaining why Congress is less likely to 
delegate authority to courts than to agencies). 
 282. See ROBERT E. KEETON, VENTURING TO DO JUSTICE 13–15 (1969). 
 283. Keeton’s objection, at most, establishes that courts can make some law in the gap, 
rather than none.  The statutory functionalists’ case for adhering to statutory policy in the 
gaps still stands in the way of the private law instrumentalists’ claim of independent 
judgment. 
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Furthermore, while statutory formalism rooted in constitutional structure 
arose in federal law, it is unclear those worries disappear because state 
courts have general common law powers.  Consider the reasons formalists 
are skeptical of federal common law.  Federalism and the Rules of Decision 
Act obviously do not bear the validity of state court lawmaking in the gaps, 
but federal concerns with separation of powers and electoral accountability 
do, albeit in modified form.284  While state courts have general common 
law powers, many state constitutions not only follow the federal model by 
assigning “the Legislative power” to the legislature,285 they also go further 
by including explicit separation-of-powers provisions and embracing the 
“Whig tradition” of parliamentary supremacy.286  One could see this 
embrace of both common law powers and parliamentary supremacy as a 
tension that vigorous instrumentalist lawmaking in the gaps exacerbates.  
Alternatively, and more plausibly, these two features’ coexistence in state 
constitutionalism reflects not a tension, but the fact that an understanding of 
common law adjudication as instrumental policy choice was alien to these 
traditions’ framers. 
Nor do judicial elections in some states obviously allay concerns about 
politically accountable lawmaking.287  The topic is complex, yet it suffices 
to say that the link between judicial elections and political accountability is 
controversial.  Many originally advocated judicial elections due to a belief 
that voters, not result-oriented legislators, were more likely to select skilled 
and impartial jurists—elections, in short, sought to take politics out of 
judging.288  Relatedly, others have argued that elections are less about 
promoting “accountability” than preserving the equal right of all citizens to 
seek office, irrespective of political connections.289  Indeed, the more 
judicial elections turn on responsiveness to electoral policy preferences, the 
more they raise due process concerns.  Ruling in a fraud action for the coal 
company that publicly bankrolled one’s campaign, after all, is a form of 
accountability in extremis.290 
An alternative response to objections like Keeton’s places less emphasis 
on inferences from constitutional structure and more on institutional 
competence.291  Arguments about the limits of policymaking by judicial 
 
 284. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 1, at 12–32 (cataloging those four factors against wide 
federal common lawmaking). 
 285. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 286. See Pojanowski, supra note 14, at 508–11 (discussing state constitutional inferences 
supporting legislative supremacy). 
 287. Cf. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl & Ethan J. Leib, Elected Judges and Statutory 
Interpretation, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1215, 1258–67 (2012) (arguing thoughtfully that in some 
circumstances, judicial elections may justify different approaches to statutory interpretation). 
 288. See Caleb Nelson, A Re-evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the 
Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 210–13 (1993). 
 289. See Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges:  Some Comparative Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1995, 1997 (1988). 
 290. See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
 291. One scholar has seen institutional competence as having constitutional valence. See 
Aziz Z. Huq, The Institution Matching Canon, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 417 (2012). 
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adjudication are well known and apply with similar force outside the federal 
context:  courts lack the expert staff of legislatures and executives; courts 
cannot control their agendas or undertake systematic reform, but rather 
must resolve cases as they come; the parties’ arguments and judicial 
remedies limit a court’s menu of policymaking options; litigated cases may 
not be representative of broader trends; courts have little systematic way to 
follow up the results of their policymaking; and so on.292  In the absence of 
any legislative activity, judicial lawmaking may be acceptable—imperfect 
tort rules may be better than no tort rules at all.  But if calibrating tort 
duties, for example, involves complex calculations of social policy, it is 
hardly obvious that a collection of judges will regularly do a better job than 
a legislature or regulatory agency that has approached the same matter, even 
if it has not spoken clearly on all the related issues.  A default rule 
precluding judicial supplementation could lead to better policy across the 
legal system, even if it is over- or underinclusive in particular cases. 
For these reasons, a court might follow Higginbotham’s approach and 
refrain from developing not only rules that conflict with a statute, but also 
rules that touch on matters that the legislature has addressed.293  To return 
to preemption analogies, the formalist’s approach would resemble the 
Supreme Court’s more sweeping doctrine of field preemption.  There, when 
Congress has legislated, no competing lawmaker can supplement the 
legislative norms; even in the face of silence, gaps must remain unfilled.294  
Tellingly, while field preemption usually pertains to federal displacement of 
state lawmaking authority—and has become less frequent in that form in 
recent years295—the Court readily treats its own common law powers as 
impliedly displaced in such fashion.296  In its jurisprudence concerning 
interstate disputes, for example, the Court regards its own lawmaking 
powers as preempted whenever federal statutory rules come within 
proximity of a dispute.297  Their reasons for invoking such field preemption 
 
 292. See Linde, supra note 243, at 824–34 (detailing how “the policy style” of tort 
adjudication “claims more than it delivers”). 
 293. Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 51 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he fact 
that Congress has created a tort remedy against federal officials at all, as it has done here 
under the FTCA, is dispositive.  The policy questions at issue in the creation of any tort 
remedies . . . involve judgments as to diverse factors that are more appropriately made by the 
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 294. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 295. See Nelson, supra note 269, at 227 (“The Court has grown increasingly hesitant to 
read implicit field preemption clauses into federal statutes.”). 
 296. See Gluck, supra note 1, at 760 (“The U.S. Supreme Court has taken a rather 
generous view of the extent to which complex federal statutory schemes are intended to 
displace any past or future judicial gap-filling efforts.”). 
 297. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981) (treating a 
“comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an expert administrative agency” as 
“occup[ying] the field”); see Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 
453 U.S. 1, 22 (1981) (same); see also Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut , 131 S. Ct. 
2527, 2537 (2011). 
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resemble,298 and at times echo,299 Higginbotham’s rationale for constraint.  
This is particularly so when the Court conceptualizes tort actions in 
instrumental terms or when litigants bring tort actions for injuries 
implicating complex problems like climate change.  The prospect of 
indeterminate, policy-laden choice leads the Court to refrain from 
elaborating private law in statutory gaps,300 even when the proposed rules 
of decisions would not formally contradict the statute and arguably would 
advance the legislation’s broader purposes.301 
D.  Implications of the Public Law Model 
Private law instrumentalism, with its skepticism of stable doctrinal 
concepts and its preference for policy-oriented problem solving, is a 
creature of American legal realism.302  Much public law scholarship in 
recent years, however, regards legal realism as a Copernican revolution 
displacing the judge from the center of the legal universe.  If resolution of 
legal uncertainty “involves no brooding omnipresence in the sky” but rather 
is “largely a judgment of policy,” then “institutions with democratic 
 
 298. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537 (2011) (“Legislative displacement of 
federal common law does not require” a “‘clear and manifest [congressional] purpose’ . . . .  
‘[I]t is primarily the office of Congress, not the federal courts, to prescribe national policy.’” 
(quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317; Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 
(1978))); Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 317 (“[W]e start with the assumption that it is for 
Congress, not federal courts, to articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as a matter 
of federal law.”). 
 299. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2537 (citing and quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. 
Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978)); Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 315 (same). 
 300. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2539 (finding there was no nuisance action 
for greenhouse gas because “as with other questions of national or international policy, 
informed assessment of competing interests is required”); Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 313 
(finding there was no nuisance action for water pollution because courts are not “better 
suited to develop national policy,” especially in light of the “usual and important concerns of 
an appropriate division of functions between the Congress and the federal judiciary”); id. at 
317 (refusing to assume that Congress has “left the formulation of appropriate federal 
standards to the courts through application of often vague and indeterminate nuisance 
concepts”). 
 301. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538 (rejecting the argument that “federal 
common law is not displaced until EPA actually exercises its regulatory authority” because 
“the field has been occupied” by Congress (quoting Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 324)); cf. 
Milwaukee II, 451 U.S. at 351–52 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that common law 
nuisance actions would promote the statute’s ecological aims and remedy inadequacies in the 
legislative regime). 
 302. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 93, at 162 (noting Prosser’s “explicitly Realist 
perspective”); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean 
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1255 (1931) (stating legal realists have “a strong tendency” 
to approach tort questions as “matters of general policy” concerning the allocation and 
reduction of risks to those “not in court”); id. at 1252 & n.70 (citing tort instrumentalist Leon 
Green’s book Judge and Jury as exemplifying the legal realist credo that “deduction” from 
“the authoritative legal tradition” “does not solve cases” and that judicial decisions are thus 
often a product “choice which can be justified only as a question of policy”). 
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accountability and technical expertise”303 preferably make these decisions.  
If administrative agencies “have become modern America’s common law 
courts, and properly so,”304 we have greater reason to doubt a presumption 
that a legislative gap implies permission for independent judicial 
elaboration, as opposed to restraint, to allow the legislature or, increasingly, 
an administrative agency, to further develop the law.305  This is so whether 
one is statutory functionalist or formalist.  The only difference is the 
functionalist would have the court fill a gap with statutory policy, while the 
formalist would have the court not fill the gap at all. 
These lessons are at odds with many private law instrumentalists’ 
approaches to legislation, at least in tort law.  Instrumentalists often assume 
courts have wide discretion in choosing between statutory purpose and its 
independent policy judgment when filling gaps.306  Their discretionary 
approach has become received wisdom.307  A more thoroughgoing statutory 
functionalism, however, prioritizes legislative purpose over the judicial 
prerogative.308  Some instrumentalists will concede that point,309 but even 
then the admission seems a hasty aside from a broader story of judicial tort 
policy.310 
The contrast between these theorists’ approach and the statutory 
formalism emerging in recent decades is even starker.  This is in part 
because founding instrumentalists wrote before the revival of theory in 
statutory interpretation that gave rise to textualism.  One instrumentalist has 
recently defended Moragne against formalist criticism by stating that the 
Court was “exercising its own admitted authority” to make law, rather than 
extending a statute’s domain.311  Yet this scholar also observes in the next 
 
 303. Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug?  Administrative Agencies As Common Law 
Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1057–58 (1998). 
 304. Id. at 1019. 
 305. Cf. VERMEULE, supra note 60, at 4 (stating that, in the case of uncertainty, “the legal 
system does best if judges assign authority to interpret those texts to other institutions—
administrative agencies in the case of statutes, legislatures in the case of the Constitution”). 
 306. See Traynor, supra note 204, at 425 (observing that filling gaps with statutory rules 
is “a discriminating choice of policy, in sharp contrast to the routine compliance with a 
legislative policy when the statute encompassing it governs”); see also Fleming James, Jr., 
Statutory Standards and Negligence in Accident Cases, 11 LA. L. REV. 95, 119 (1950) 
(noting that because courts are “entering upon judicial law making” when they incorporate 
statutory standards, it is “mechanical and doctrinaire” for courts not to “exercis[e] their own 
judgment as to whether the transplanted standard is appropriate to the new purpose”); 
William L. Prosser, Contributory Negligence As Defense to Violation of Statute, 32 MINN. L. 
REV. 105, 108 (1948) (similar). 
 307. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A & cmt. d. (1979). 
 308. Cf. Linde, supra note 243, at 824 (“[M]y modest heresy is that an opinion should not 
invoke public policy unless it can cite a source for it.”). 
 309. See, e.g., KEETON, supra note 282, at 94 (indicating courts must defer to legislative 
purpose before crafting policy). 
 310. See id. at 16–18 (explaining how the institutional limits of legislatures require more 
courts to “overrul[e] precedents” in the name of reform). 
 311. Perlman, supra note 228, at 850.  Chancellor Perlman was an adviser for the most 
recent torts Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & 
EMOTIONAL HARM, at v (2011). 
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breath that duty rules “are inevitably a product of a court’s assessment of 
policy factors to determine whether liability is appropriate.”312  As one 
venerable state judge noted, such judicial “policymaking must be prepared 
to face politics.”313  Once we flatten private law adjudication onto the plane 
of legislative policymaking, such invocation of the traditional judicial role 
appears quaint at best.  The instrumentalist’s claim for power to supplement 
statutory schemes with background private law doctrine trades on the 
institutional divisions of a disclaimed era where the common law judge was 
depoliticized and heroic.  It is simply not realist enough.  At this point, the 
collapse of private law into public law truly seems complete.314 
V.  TORT LAW AS PRIVATE LAW 
Conceptual theorists who defend the autonomy of private law, 
unsurprisingly, reject this collapse.  It would be more interesting if public 
law theories of statutory interpretation did so as well.  The confluence of 
private law conceptualism’s premises with interpretive theory’s 
commitments suggests that, in fact, is the case.  The more we understand 
private law doctrine as having an autonomous, internally coherent logic, the 
more freedom courts will have to develop private law on its own terms 
where the legislature is silent or has spoken unclearly.  A reexamination of 
the wrongful death cases under conceptualist premises demonstrates how 
this effect is true under statutory functionalism and, surprisingly, is most 
pronounced under statutory formalism, an approach most frequently 
associated with judicial restraint. 
A.  Reconceptualizing Wrongful Death 
Traditionally, tort law rejected wrongful death claims, holding that the 
only proper plaintiff could be a living person who suffered injury.315  Most 
common law jurisdictions abrogated that rule through statute,316 but it was 
not inevitable that reform had to proceed by legislation.  Before the 
Supreme Court decided the Harrisburg, some lower federal admiralty 
courts allowed tort-like suits for wrongful death absent legislation.317  The 
 
 312. Perlman, supra note 228, at 851. 
 313. Linde, supra note 243, at 844 (emphasis added); see Philip P. Frickey, Honoring 
Hans:  On Linde, Lawmaking, and Legacies, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 157 (2007) (discussing 
Linde’s accomplishments). 
 314. This analysis does not offer a conclusive case against instrumentalist lawmaking in 
the gaps.  Textualism and purposivism, as prominent as they are, do not exhaust 
contemporary approaches to statutory interpretation. See generally CALABRESI, supra note 
241; ESKRIDGE, supra note 17. 
 315. See Baker v. Bolton, (1808) 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B.) 1033; RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 925 cmt. a (1979). 
 316. See 4 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER, JAMES 
AND GRAY ON TORTS § 24.1, at 536 (3rd ed. 2006) (stating that the traditional rule “has been 
modified by statute in all of our states” and that “almost all civil remedies for wrongful death 
derive from statute”); see also Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., c. 93 (Eng.). 
 317. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 387–88 (1970). 
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same held for some state courts until the middle of the nineteenth 
century.318  Courts could have continued recognizing wrongful death 
actions or abrogated the traditional presumption against such suits as a 
matter of decisional law.  In fact, some more recent state court decisions 
treat wrongful death actions as part of their common law that would exist 
without legislation.319  The natural doctrinal frame for judicial recognition 
of wrongful death is duty in tort law.  The private law conceptualist’s 
relational approach can challenge the common law’s resistance to third-
party wrongful death actions. 
Plaintiffs, if they are at least the decedent’s immediate relatives, have 
plausible arguments that the negligent killing of the decedent breaches a 
relational duty to them.  Despite the facial appeal of the objection that a 
wrongful death plaintiff sues as “the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of 
duty to another,”320 there is a strong argument that family members fall into 
the duty-defining “orbit of . . . danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable 
vigilance.”321  A sailor’s death causes highly foreseeable harm to 
dependents even if they are not present at the time of the careless action.322  
Just as the sale of a negligently manufactured car breaches a duty to the 
purchaser and absent future passengers, careless steering of a ship is a 
wrong to the sailor and to the family who loses him. 
The character of the familial relationship also suggests that wrongful 
death claims will not fail even though the plaintiffs seek relief for economic 
or emotional injuries.  To be sure, a defendant may claim that the spouse is 
trying to use the sailor’s right to bodily integrity to protect her economic 
and emotional interests absent any special relationship or circumstances.323  
This plausible argument runs up against longstanding tort doctrine allowing 
family members to bring loss-of-society suits based on nonfatal physical 
injuries to family members.324  The familial relationship is sufficiently 
 
 318. See 4 HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 316, § 24.1, at 536 n.1 (“The rule was 
originally not followed in the United States but came to be adopted only well into the 
nineteenth century, beginning with an 1848 Massachusetts opinion.”). 
 319. See Haakanson v. Wakefield Seafoods, Inc., 600 P.2d 1087, 1092 n.11 (Alaska 
1979); Hun v. Ctr. Props., 626 P.2d 182, 187 n.3 (Haw. 1981); Gaudette v. Webb, 284 
N.E.2d 222, 229 (Mass. 1972). 
 320. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928). 
 321. Id. 
 322. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (finding a 
duty to a nonpurchaser because the seller “knew also that the car would be used by persons 
other than the buyer.  This was apparent from its size; there were seats for three persons”); 
Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265, 270 (Ohio 1989) (finding that a defendant with a 
sexually transmittable disease has a duty not only to his immediate sexual partner, but also 
other highly foreseeable victims like the partner’s spouse). 
 323. See Benson, supra note 116, at 877–78 (stating that Palsgraf and the economic-loss 
rule “stand together as variations of a single theme . . . .  [T]he plaintiffs failed because they 
could not establish a claim that was freestanding with respect to the requirements of duty, 
but instead attempt to piggyback on their fulfillment through the defendant’s relation to a 
third party”). 
 324. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 693 (1976); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, 
Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 37–38 (1998). 
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fundamental that tort law deems the breach to the physically injured person 
as a breach to her family members for purposes of that action.325  There 
may be borderline questions defining immediate family,326 but the central 
principle is well established.  Why death, as opposed to a nonfatal injury, 
defeats the principle is unclear.  The principle, moreover, can be based on 
the unity of interests between the deceased and the family, who are linked 
to the defendant through a normatively significant relationship of suffering 
and doing harm.327 
Emotional and economic injuries from the death of loved ones may run 
on the outer ring of duty’s orbit,328 but the point here is to show the 
plausibility of relationally grounded duty in the absence of statutes, not to 
establish it conclusively.  More importantly, this framework of preexisting 
rights, wrongs, obligations, and relationships does not turn primarily on 
policy balancing or direct engagement with global concerns of distributive 
justice.  The following two sections will analyze how this conception of 
duty affects the application of statutes like DOHSA, the Jones Act, and 
cognate state wrongful death statutes. 
B.  Private Law Conceptualism and Statutory Functionalism 
The functionalist’s tendency to advance statutory purpose beyond the 
letter of legislation increases conflicts between statutory and private law 
norms.  Take Gaudet or Higginbotham as examples.  Assume that a 
relational understanding of duty required redress for loss-of-society injuries 
in both cases.  The court’s understanding of the aims of the statutory regime 
will determine whether private law’s generous remedies in the gap are 
consistent with relevant legislation.  DOHSA and the Jones Act’s liberal, 
remedial character may recommend an expansive private law remedy where 
Congress has not spoken explicitly.  On the other hand, the fact that the 
statutes had been consistently read to preclude such relief raises the 
possibility that faithful agency requires similar limitations in the 
background law.  If that latter argument prevails, the claimants in Gaudet 
 
 325. Zipursky, supra note 324, at 38 (describing courts as using a “one person” metaphor 
in loss-of-consortium suits). 
 326. See, e.g., Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980) (deciding 
whether a loss-of-consortium action was available when a couple had divorced and 
reconciled, but not remarried). 
 327. Cf. Martin Stone, The Significance of Doing and Suffering, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE 
LAW OF TORTS 131, 131–32 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) (positing that instrumentalism fails 
to provide the necessary “account of tort law which attaches direct normative significance to 
the relation that exists between two persons whenever it appropriately can be said, 
concerning a certain injury, that one person ‘did it’ and the other ‘suffered it’”). 
 328. Zipursky, supra note 324, at 37 (“For even in family member cases, the law is . . . 
uncomfortable permitting a plaintiff t[o] sue for torts to a third person . . . .”). 
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and Higginbotham might lose even if they would have prevailed as a matter 
of private law in the absence of any legislation.329 
Even if statutory purpose points against relief, the plaintiffs might try to 
leverage the background private law in their favor.  While a strain of 
statutory functionalism is hostile to insulating judicial norms from 
legislative purpose,330 purposivism is not uniformly critical.  Hart and 
Sacks recognized the value of “harmoniz[ing]” statutes with “more general 
principles and policies of law,” even to the point of requiring clear 
statements to abrogate aspects of the legal system that “transcend the 
wishes of any particular session of the legislature.”331  This purposivist 
proviso has little force when the background private law reflects 
instrumental judicial policymaking.332  If we understand such doctrine on 
conceptual terms, preserving background private law would respect and 
promote the systemic coherence of legal reason that Hart and Sacks sought 
to foster. 
First, Hart and Sacks instructed interpreters to presume that legislative 
drafters were reasonable people “pursuing reasonable purposes 
reasonably.”333  Imagine now that a statute contains a gap, such as omission 
(but not explicit exclusion) of nonpecuniary damages.  Imagine also that, as 
conceptualists argue, the law of negligence is a coherent and relatively 
stable body of doctrine capable of resolving disputes in a principled, 
disciplined fashion.  A presumption preserving this background private law 
in the gap would promote coherence, reason, and predictability in the body 
of law as a whole, particularly if arguments from statutory purpose do not 
point in one direction.  A reasonable legislator would want courts to draw 
on this body of doctrine—a body that “transcend[s] the wishes of any 
particular legislative session”—to fill out the legislative regime.334 
Second, the conceptual theorist’s claim that private law is not 
jurisprudentially fungible with legislation can affect the application of Hart 
and Sacks’s “principle of institutional settlement.”  That principle holds that 
“decisions which are the duly arrived at result of duly established 
procedures” for making decisions should be “accepted as binding.”335  That 
principle appears circular until linked with the related principle assigning 
decisions to the institutions best suited to decide particular questions.336  
 
 329. The same problem occurs if we reverse the positions.  If a conceptual inquiry found 
no right to loss of consortium but DOHSA and the Jones Act did, a purposive approach 
creates a conflict with the private law rule, however sound it might be on conceptual terms. 
 330. See supra Part IV.B. 
 331. See HART & SACKS, supra note 19, at 1209, 1376; supra Part IV.A. 
 332. See supra Part IV.B. 
 333. HART & SACKS, supra note 19, at 1378. 
 334. Id. at 1377. 
 335. Id. at 4. 
 336. See ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 132 (1998) 
(noting apparent circularity); Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing 
Judicial System, 54 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1150 (2005) (linking institutional competence with 
settlement). 
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Legal process theorists aspire to match decisionmaking authority with 
competence in defining the procedures due for resolving particular 
questions.  With that in mind, recall the claim that private law is the domain 
of corrective justice suitable to adjudication, while public law concerns 
matters of distributive justice proper to the legislature.  This distinction 
resembles one drawn by Lon Fuller, whose thought looms large in the legal 
process tradition.  Fuller argued that adjudication is most appropriate for 
problems amenable to resolution by focused, reasoned argument from 
principles and presentation of proofs.337 Adjudication is inappropriate for 
“polycentric” problems marked by complex, interdependent relationships 
and repercussions.338  These tasks, such as setting appropriate wages and 
prices, are better resolved by market negotiation or managerial direction.339 
The multifactor considerations underlying judgments of distributive justice 
mark those decisions as quintessentially polycentric, in contrast to 
corrective justice’s more focused tasks of determining a particular party’s 
rights and restoring equilibrium.  Sound application of the principle of 
institutional settlement steers such private law disputes toward adjudicative 
resolution by established juridical principles. 
An interpreter can therefore presume that a reasonable legislature, whose 
core competence concerns distributive justice, did not intend to indirectly 
disrupt the functioning of this system of corrective justice.340  Such a stance 
does not entail denigration or hostility toward the legislature’s prerogative.  
Even coherent, purposive, and preemptive statutes can leave matters 
unaddressed in explicit terms; when they do, one can reasonably assume the 
legislature did not intend to deprive the legal system of preexisting, 
principled sources of law.  Nor does this deny that legislatures can rebut the 
presumption and modify background private law.  Different legal 
institutions have characteristic forms of norms and modes of action, and a 
presumption against legislative abrogation of background private law tracks 
that recognition. 
This push and pull between statutory purpose and background private 
law norms here will resemble the unstable federal doctrine of “obstacle” 
preemption discussed in Part IV.B.  There, a federal court attempts to 
reconcile respect for the purpose and policies of federal legislation with a 
background presumption against preemption rooted in respect for state 
sovereignty.  Here, the statutory functionalist similarly looks to extend 
legislative norms beyond their semantic domain while adhering to a 
 
 337. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 364 
(1978) (identifying the process of “presenting proofs and reasoned arguments” as “the 
distinguishing characteristic of adjudication”). 
 338. Id. at 394–95. 
 339. Id. at 398–99. 
 340. The same conclusion follows if tort law is a system of private recourse provided by 
the state, but whose particular norms the state does not directly endorse.  As with corrective 
justice, civil recourse theories focus on principles of relational rights and obligations.  Thus, 
civil recourse theorists have advanced similar arguments concerning institutional 
competence. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 10, at 1839–40. 
2014] PRIVATE LAW IN THE GAPS 1743 
 
presumption against displacement of background private law.  The 
underlying reasons for the respective presumptions are not identical, though 
treating private law as a domain distinct from public law’s realm of 
distributive justice is reminiscent of notions of dual sovereignty. 
The conceptualists’ understanding of private law as relatively 
autonomous and coherent, combined with the legal process theorists’ 
valuation of coherence and reason in the legal fabric, lead to a creative 
tension at the intersection of private law and statute.  The results of 
individual inquiries will be varied and particularistic—much like obstacle 
preemption in federal law—but the counterbalance that the private law 
conceptualist adds to the mix will permit persistence of background law in 
some cases of conflict.  This stands in contrast to the regular subordination 
of private law norms to statutory purpose that is likely to occur when 
judicial doctrine is understood in instrumental terms. 
C.  Private Law Conceptualism and Statutory Formalism 
Private law conceptualism rejects the instrumentalist’s regulatory 
understanding of the doctrine, while statutory formalists limit a statute’s 
domain to its reasonably clear semantic meaning.  These two features offer 
mutually reinforcing reasons for preserving background private law 
doctrine in statutory gaps. 
1.  Against Extension of Statutory Purpose 
Textualists are unwilling to expand a statute’s reach beyond its 
reasonably clear semantic meaning, even if doing so advances the statute’s 
policy or purpose.  For these reasons, a party seeking to invoke a statute has 
to rebut a strong presumption against its applicability.341  The statutory 
formalist would accordingly reject an approach like Moragne, in which a 
court extends the reach of textually inapplicable statutes to govern a 
dispute.  When, as in most federal cases today, courts are understood to lack 
general common law powers, the inapplicability of any statute entails that a 
plaintiff fails to state a claim.  In state courts, or in enclaves of federal 
common law, that conclusion does not follow.  Rather, the court could treat 
the question as one governed by private law norms operating within the 
court’s common law residuary.  A counterfactual Moragne might overrule 
the Harrisburg because of its flawed understanding of duty doctrine.  But 
rather than engaging in compromise-upsetting legislative analogy, the Court 
would be simply applying private law principles where the legislature has 
not spoken. 
Sometimes, as in Moragne, a statutory rule matches what a court could 
have found as a matter of private law.  Other times, background doctrine 
may depart from the adjacent statute’s decisional rules.  Gaudet offers such 
an example.  Assume that (a) judicially elaborated private law would allow 
 
 341. See Easterbrook, supra note 5, at 533–34. 
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for the Gaudet plaintiff’s loss-of-society action, but (b) adjacent statutes 
indicate a policy favoring pecuniary damages only.  Extension of statutory 
purpose would extinguish remedies to which the claimant would have been 
entitled by a common law court’s application of private law principles.  In 
terms of respecting the textual domain of a statute, tamping out a private 
law remedy here is as problematic as extending such a remedy from a 
statute.  It treats Congress’s decision to provide only pecuniary damages 
under DOHSA and the Jones Act as a decision to also eliminate loss of 
society in other actions on which Congress did not legislate.  The statutory 
formalist’s presumption against a statute’s applicability protects preexisting 
private law rights. 
2.  Against Displacement 
Statutory formalism’s understanding of a statute’s domain does most of 
the work in rejecting extension of legislative policy beyond a statute’s 
domain.  A conceptualist approach to private law is most critical for 
considering the further argument that no judicial elaboration of any kind of 
law in the gaps is permitted. 
The concerned formalist replying to the analysis above may echo 
Higginbotham and argue that allowing claims in Moragne and Gaudet 
upsets an implicit compromise that relief in maritime death suits should go 
as far as legislation provides and no further.  On these grounds, statutes 
extinguish private law within their orbits, even by their silence.  This brings 
us back to the formalist’s reasons for inferring from silence a wide margin 
of preemption of background private law:  a constitutional preference for 
policymaking by legislatures and doubts about courts’ comparative 
competence in lawmaking.  Conceptualist understandings of private law 
have greater immunity from these objections than the instrumentalist 
approach exemplified by the actual Gaudet majority. 
Both objections assume that resolution of legal uncertainty requires 
lawmaking on instrumentalist terms.342  Remove that premise and the case 
for a negative inference from silence is weaker.  Consider the prophylactic 
norm protecting the legislature’s supremacy.  If duty norms are forward-
looking, governance-based rules dependent on interest-balancing, policy 
analysis, or risk-spreading, judicially generated private law in the gaps 
competes directly with the legislature.  By contrast, conceptual 
justifications rely primarily on backward-looking, well-established norms 
of relational duty between injurer and sufferer.  On these terms, the 
enterprise of private law is a different “market,” so to speak, than 
prescriptive regulation.  As with other markets, the state helps construct 
private law’s forum of civil recourse or corrective justice, but it does not 
follow that the state promulgates the forum’s norms in top-down, legislative 
 
 342. Cf. Homemakers N. Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408, 411 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(Easterbrook, J.) (“An ambiguous legal rule does not have a single ‘right’ meaning; there is a 
range of possible meanings; the selection from the range is an act of policymaking.”). 
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fashion.343  If statutory formalism turns on constitutional considerations like 
respect for legislative supremacy and compromise, preserving background 
private law so conceived is less problematic. 
A conceptual understanding of private law also harmonizes apparently 
inconsistent state constitutional structures that include both inherent 
common law powers and strong norms of legislative supremacy and 
separation of powers.344  Allowing a court to elaborate—in common law 
fashion—noninstrumental rules of private law where the legislature is silent 
recognizes the traditional judicial prerogative without trenching on the 
legislature’s primacy in policymaking.  Similarly, conceptual 
understandings of private law, with their emphasis on craft, doctrinal 
facility, and pursuit of principled coherence, mesh with the plausible 
arguments noted above that the constitutional purpose of state judicial 
elections is to open public offices to talents irrespective of political 
connections.345 
Conceptualism also complicates preemptive arguments grounded in 
institutional competence.  A central argument against instrumentalism is 
that conceptual approaches do not require courts to undertake the unwieldy 
policy balancing and unmoored value choice involved in distributive justice 
by adjudicative means.  If, for example, tort law is the legal form of 
corrective justice, and if corrective justice is particularly well suited to 
adjudication, the institutional arguments regarding background tort law 
flow in favor of the courts, not legislatures.  In short, while some of the 
worries animating formalists’ hostility toward federal common lawmaking 
are still germane to state courts’ gap filling under instrumentalist premises, 
conceptual understandings mitigate such concerns across the board. 
The conceptualist’s emphasis on private law’s coherence further 
reassures the statutory formalist.  Just as statutory formalists are willing to 
assume the absence of an explicit statute of limitations does not entail an 
unlimited time to file, they could also be willing to look to a stable 
background law to inform silences on tort law duties and remedies.346  This 
is because “statutes fit into the normal operation of the legal system unless 
the political branches provide otherwise.”347 Textualists seek such 
integration because their approach treats as authoritative the meaning a 
 
 343. See Goldberg, supra note 77, at 1656 (“[Private] law’s authority resides as much in 
its ability to articulate recognizable [extralegal] norms of conduct as in the state’s 
enforcement power.”); Zipursky, supra note 77, at 650 (“[Civil recourse theory leaves open 
the possibility that there are many cases where enforcement of private rights of action leads 
to undesirable or unjust outcomes, yet the state is not necessarily responsible for those 
outcomes.”). 
 344. See supra Part IV.C. 
 345. See supra Part IV.C. 
 346. Cf. Manning, What Divides, supra note 16, at 82 n.42 (“[T]extualists read otherwise 
unqualified statutes of limitations in light of the settled judicial practice of equitable 
tolling.”). 
 347. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers:  Revisited, 112 HARV. 
L. REV. 1913, 1914 (1999). 
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“reasonable user of language” would attribute to the statute “in the 
circumstances in which it is used.”348  To harness that meaning, the 
interpreter must account for “assumptions shared by the speakers and the 
intended audience,”349 and settled principles of background law are 
essential for grasping that point of view.350  Even a statutory formalist 
could then be unwilling to treat a gap as a compromise-precluding repair to 
general tort principles. 
Of course, absent some prepolitical or constitutional right to private law 
recourse in particular forms,351 a statute’s terms could extinguish the duty 
underpinning wrongful death actions or even replace negligence law as a 
whole.352  When the background law contradicts express legislative rules 
covering a dispute, the background must yield law.  The legislature can also 
limit the court’s repair to background law “by enacting a closed list” of 
remedies, for example.353  The question is whether the explicit choice of 
one form of remedy, or of providing a remedy to one class of persons, 
without more, constitutes a “closed list” precluding other relief that would 
have been available in a nonstatutory context.354  The analysis above gives 
reasons why a statutory formalist need not treat silence as impliedly 
clearing background law beyond the statute’s semantic domain. 
This restrained approach to legislation in the vicinity of private law 
resembles some statutory formalists’ bid to bring textualism’s interpretive 
discipline to federal preemption doctrine.  They argue that preemption of 
state law that is an “obstacle” to congressional purpose commits the same 
sins of the purposive approach in ordinary interpretation.355  Courts, they 
argue, should treat state law as preempted only when its rules contradict 
federal law governing the same matter, not because of purposive emanation 
of legislative policy.356  Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court’s sole 
 
 348. Manning, What Divides, supra note 16, at 81. 
 349. Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 441, 443 (1990). 
 350. See Easterbrook, supra note 347, at 1913 (“Language takes meaning from its 
linguistic context, but historical and governmental contexts also matter.”); see also 
Pojanowski, supra note 14, at 482–83 (discussing the role of context in textualist theory). 
 351. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law:  Due Process and 
the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005) (defending such a 
constitutional right). This Article takes no stance on such claims. 
 352. See, e.g., The Accident Compensation Act 2001 (N.Z.) (displacing New Zealand’s 
common law negligence regime for personal injuries with a no-fault reimbursement system). 
 353. Easterbrook, supra note 347, at 1914. 
 354. Cf. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 458 
(1974) (“This principle of statutory construction reflects an ancient maxim—expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius.”). 
 355. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 587 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing 
practice as illicitly “expand[ing] federal statutes beyond their terms”); Nelson, supra note 
269, at 231 (“[C]onstitutional law has no place for the Court’s fuzzier notions of ‘obstacle’ 
preemption . . . .”). 
 356. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 588 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that “[p]re-emption 
must turn on whether state law conflicts with the text of the relevant federal statute[s]” 
understood in terms of “ordinary meanings”); Nelson, supra note 269, at 231–32 (arguing 
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consistent proponent of this approach, has not persuaded his colleagues thus 
far,357 but the Court has become less willing to find implied preemption of 
an entire field of state law, often requiring express statutory language before 
administering this harsher medicine.358 
The conceptualist’s theses about the distinctiveness and relative 
autonomy of private law make such analogies possible.  Federal preemption 
doctrine presupposes two legitimate legal domains operating on two 
different plains, with one body of law capable of displacing the other when 
the two conflict on the same subject matter.  Private law conceptualism 
allows for this kind of jurisprudential pluralism, while the statutory 
formalist’s restrained approach to interpretation allows that defeasible body 
of private law to persist even when it conflicts with the spirit, but not the 
letter, of public legislation. 
D.  Implications and Further Questions 
Under functionalist and formalist approaches to statutory interpretation 
alike, background private law is more likely to persist in the gaps of 
legislation when the interpreter understands that body of doctrine on 
conceptualist terms.  The more formalist the interpreter, the less likely she 
will be to invoke legislation to displace private law doctrine in the spaces 
between statutes.  This conclusion may be counterintuitive to those steeped 
in federal jurisprudence, where formalist statutory interpretation and respect 
for separation of powers are almost synonymous with effacement of the 
judicial role.  Given the premises of traditional private law conceptualism, 
legislative supremacy and judicial elaboration of law are more than 
consistent; respect for the compromises struck by a supreme legislator can 
even require preservation of judicial power to apply private law in the gaps. 
For private law, further important questions also remain in the weeds of 
conceptualist theory, or, more precisely, conceptualist theories.  Variations 
in the approaches, smoothed over here to sketch general tendencies, may 
affect the intersection of private law and statute.  Private law’s insulation 
from public legislation appears most secure when theorized in the apolitical 
abstraction of the conceptual formalism propounded by theorists like 
Professor Weinrib.  Doctrine understood along the lines of civil recourse 
theorists, whose pragmatism nudges conceptualism closer to the dynamic, 
 
that “preemption occurs if and only if state law contradicts a valid rule established by federal 
law” in terms of “the particular words and contexts of the federal statutes,” and not merely 
because “federal law serves certain purposes”). 
 357. Justice Thomas garnered a partial majority for this approach in Pliva, Inc. v. 
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011), where he found a conflict. Id. at 2577.  Whether his 
colleagues will join him when rejection of obstacle preemption protects state law is 
uncertain. See Daniel Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 6 (2013) 
(“[I]t is possible, though far from clear, that Justice Thomas’s approach will gain support 
from his colleagues.”). 
 358. See Nelson, supra note 269, at 227 & n.12 (collecting cases). 
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controversial value choices that mark functionalism, may fare differently.359  
Conceptualist theories thus may exist on a spectrum of autonomy from 
public law theory’s interpretive reach.  Such a continuum further 
underscores the provocative possibility that a union of formalist 
constraint—rule-based, modern formalism in statutory interpretation paired 
with the abstract principles of classical formalism in private law theory—
leaves the widest scope of judicial freedom in the gaps consonant with 
legislative supremacy and democratic disagreement. 
CONCLUSION 
New private law jurisprudence and public law theories of statutory 
interpretation have largely remained strangers to each other, raising the 
question of whether private law needs an intervention from statutory 
interpretation.  The arguments above indicate that answer should depend 
most importantly on the interpreter’s understanding of private law and 
secondarily on the interpreter’s method of statutory interpretation. 
For the private law instrumentalist, in most every case the gap-filling 
interpreter must reconcile the private law prerogative with public law 
theories of statutory interpretation that are not agnostic about how judicial 
actors make policy beyond the linguistic boundaries of statutes.  All 
questions of tort law within the vicinity of statutes—in short, most 
questions in contemporary practice360—will also be questions of statutory 
interpretation.  Most tort theorists, including instrumentalists, are not very 
interested in statutory interpretation.361  But if the instrumentalists are 
correct, this indifference to legislation and its interpretation is unjustified. 
By contrast, conceptualism entails that fewer problems at the intersection 
of private law and legislation will in fact be questions of statutory 
interpretation.  For the statutory formalist, interpretation ends at the shores 
of semantic meaning, leaving disputes in the gaps as questions of unwritten, 
autonomous private law.  On those grounds, private law scholars’ 
disengagement from statutory interpretation theory is more understandable.  
Matters are more complicated for the statutory functionalist who must 
reconcile legislative purpose with private law norms.  That fact is not 
surprising, given how nonformalists tend to understand “interpretation” as a 
task broader than reasonably identifying an enacted text’s linguistic 
 
 359. See Oberdiek, supra note 153, at 192 (stating that Zipursky’s approach is 
“constrained instrumentalism” that “endorses form over function,” but not “to the exclusion 
of function”). 
 360. See Perlman, supra note 228, at 814 (“[I]t may be a rare case where one of the 
parties [to a tort case] cannot assert some legislative enactment in support of their claim or 
defense.”). 
 361. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 
cmt. f reporters’ note, at 165 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1. 2005) (“The task of understanding 
the purpose or purposes underlying a statute is often difficult.  Even so, the theoretical 
debates that have marked the general project of legislative interpretation in recent years have 
not broken out in these negligence per se cases.”). 
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meaning.362  Even conceptualism will not remove private law entirely from 
the sights of purposive statutory interpretation, but it is more likely to keep 
that received doctrine intact. 
These divergent results from instrumentalism and conceptualism are not 
isolated phenomena.  They mirror, for example, federal and state courts’ 
competing approaches to conflicts-of-law problems like the extraterritorial 
application of statutes.  As Professor Caleb Nelson has detailed, federal 
courts tend to regard such matters as questions of statutory interpretation, 
while state courts treat them as presumptively governed by uncodified 
choice-of-law rules.363  Professor Nelson explains that this dichotomy is 
part of a larger pattern of federal courts’ “statutification” of problems at the 
intersection of unwritten law and legislation, in contrast to state court 
practice of treating uncodified doctrine as outside a statute’s domain unless 
legislation explicitly displaces it.364 
This parallel is illuminating both for private law theory and for other 
bodies of unwritten law.  Nelson argues that the “federal” model responds 
to “broad statements about unwritten law in our federal system,” 
particularly Erie’s endorsement of Holmes’s thesis that “law in the sense in 
which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite 
authority behind it.”365  If no law on those terms can be unwritten, the 
question of a court’s source of authority to promulgate law is continually 
relevant.  Modern instrumentalism in private law similarly originates in 
Holmes’s rejection of unwritten law immanent in common law decisions, 
raising cognate questions about judicial authority and discretion.  Erie, after 
all, started as a negligence case about duties to alleged trespassers.366 
When judicial doctrine is both fungible with and subordinate to the 
legislature’s directives, it behooves the court to always treat adjacent 
statutes as pertinent.  We should not be surprised, then, when considerations 
of statutory interpretation originating in federal public law theory intrude on 
even a state court’s gap-filling prerogative, at least when that court views 
background private law on the same kind of instrumental terms.  In the 
words of a leading federal scholar, “[t]he power of positivistic thinking by 
now ought to have carried us even beyond the declaration in Erie . . . .  
There is no state general common law, either.”367  By impliedly accepting 
the federal model of unwritten law, private law instrumentalists also take on 
many of the worries about judicial competence and legitimacy 
 
 362. Cf. Ronald Dworkin, Law As Interpretation, 9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 179 (1982). 
 363. Nelson, supra note 1, at 660–61. 
 364. Id. at 666–67, 724. 
 365. Id. at 724 (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938)).  Professor 
Nelson himself has concluded that the reports of the death of unwritten federal law have 
been greatly exaggerated. See generally Nelson, supra note 65. 
 366. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69–70. 
 367. Weinberg, supra note 69, at 819.  Professor Weinberg uses this similarity to argue 
that federal courts should have more freedom to create common law than current doctrines 
allow. 
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accompanying that structure, even when the interpreter is a state court.368  
Private law conceptualism’s rejection of this reductive understanding of 
uncodified law leaves its appliers less burdened by those concerns, hence 
the resemblance between Nelson’s “state law model” and the private law 
conceptualist’s inclination to treat legislative gaps as governed by unwritten 
law.369 
Finally, this Article’s analysis of the relationship between legislation and 
private law doctrine offers fresh evidence for methodological debates in 
private law theory.  As noted, much of the practice of private law in the 
vicinity of legislation assumes substantial independent judicial judgment to 
develop doctrine where the legislature has not spoken.370  This freedom is 
most readily justified when that background private law is understood on 
noninstrumental grounds.  By contrast, the obstacles instrumentalist 
theories pose to accepted practices demand either diminished judicial 
autonomy in legislative gaps or a fresh justification for the status quo that 
incorporates public law theories on legislation.  For many instrumentalists, 
the first option may not be palatable and the second, while not without 
potential resources, requires more work than many commentators have 
expended thus far.371  Absent further work along those lines, 
noninstrumentalist understandings of private law fit more naturally with the 
contemporary theories of legislation and longstanding practices of common 
law courts.  If theories that explain more of a subject are superior to those 
that explain less, this analysis of private law and legislation’s domain 
suggests an important interpretive data point favoring conceptualist theories 
to instrumentalist readings of private law.372 
 
 368. Many, but not all.  As noted, the concerns about federalism or the Judiciary Act that 
dog federal common law are inapplicable. 
 369. As a corollary, the legitimacy of state courts’ use of Nelson’s “state model” turns on 
the courts’ conception of the unwritten law at stake.  The more a jurisdiction’s choice-of-law 
rules reflect the policy-laden interest balancing of the conflicts revolution, and the more a 
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